Some Thoughts on Trump's National Security Strategy

Earlier this week the Trump Administration released its updated National Security Strategy. (See: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf ) Needless to say that given the howls that went up, it was far from being universally applauded, especially in Europe. Europe is rightly concerned that the era of having a NATO umbrella over the continent is over. However, given earlier commentaries coming from Vice President Vance, in particular, the document should not come as a surprise. Trump’s policy of selling out allies and cozying up to adversaries is all there in black and white.

I have three preliminary thoughts on the strategy. First, it is harkening back to the America First of 1939-1941. It focuses in on hemispheric security to the exclusion of Europe and just has America First leader Charles Lindbergh was open to a modus vivendi with Nazi Germany, here we have America open to a condominium with Putin’s Russia. It certainly does not bode well for Ukraine and for that matter Israel. Further, the strategy puts policy muscle behind Trump’s Caribbean buildup against Venezuela. To the Trump Administration Latin America is now part of an American economic zone.

Second, there is the strong smell of Yalta in the document. Instead of Roosevelt and Stalin dividing up Europe, we now have Trump, Putin and especially Xi dividing up the world into spheres of interest. The glue holding the deal together is economic self-interest. Where Taiwan fits into this over the longer term is very ambiguous.

Third, there are some hard policy realities behind the document. Europe has the ability to defend itself against Russia; it only lacks the will. Russia remains bogged down in Ukraine after more than three years of war indicating it is not as strong as once thought. If Ukraine can hold its own against Russia, so too can a much larger Europe.

What perhaps pissed off Europe the most was that the document called out its “civilization decline.” Unfortunately, that is the reality, and Europe has to recognize that advanced welfare states cannot run a policy of open borders without severe consequences. Simply put, in a generation Europe will not be the Europe of history. Net net, the policy calls for the U.S. to be an offshore balancer with respect to the world outside of Latin America. (See: https://shulmaven.blogspot.com/2025/08/my-review-of-andrew-lamberts-no-more.html )

My Review of Andrew Lambert's "No More Napoleons"

The Balance of Power

King’s College naval historian Andrew Lambert has written an over-detailed evaluation of British geopolitical strategy from 1793-1914. After fighting France for 22 years Britain settled on a strategy of offshore balancing and maintaining order in Europe enforced by the Royal Navy and a small expeditionary force. The initial goal was to prevent a revanchist France from regaining control of Europe. The architects were Prime Minister Lord Liverpool, Foreign Secretary Castlereagh, and the Duke of Wellington. The latter initially as the hero of Waterloo and later as prime minister. Their policies were enhanced by Lord Palmerston as both foreign secretary and prime minister.

Britain’s greatest fear was that a continental power could launch an invasion from the low countries. Hence it was crucial to keep France out of the Scheldt Estuary and the Port of Antwerp. When Belgium split off from Holland the 1839 Neutrality Treaty orchestrated by Palmerston kept France out. The result of that treaty and Britain’s troop presence in Belgium in 1870, kept both France and Germany out of Belgium during their war. This would not be so in 1914.

The linchpin of the strategy was the power of the Royal Navy whose goal was to be at least twice as strong as any two powers. Aside from a quantitative advantage the Royal Navy had the most technologically advanced fleet by taking advantage of steam power, screw propellers, gunnery, and hydrology. The Royal Navy truly ruled the waves and it enabled Britain to become a global power through its colonies, but for that power to be maintained there had to be an offshore balance in Europe.

For most of the 19^th century the policy succeeded largely because France was in a long-term relative decline while Britain was moving to its heights. However, after 1870 Britain entered into a relative decline in relationship to a newly reunified Germany. As a result, it required an alliance with France which severely limited Britain’s freedom of action. Britain learned the hard way in the trenches of France. Given all of Britain’s interest in Belgium, it is a wonder why Germany was unsure about Britain’s entry in World War I after it invaded Belgium.

Although Lambert discusses the 1815 Vienna settlement, he makes little note of Count Metternich of Austria whose interest in a stable Europe was greater than Britain’s. He also does not cite Henry Kissinger’s “A World Restored” on the Congress of Vienna. He also left out a discussion on the 1878 Congress of Berlin where British Prime Minister Disraeli played a leading role in settling, at least for a time, the Balkan question. There is way too much information in this book, and I would only recommend it to history nerds.