My Review of Andrew Lambert's "No More Napoleons"

The Balance of Power

King’s College naval historian Andrew Lambert has written an over-detailed evaluation of British geopolitical strategy from 1793-1914. After fighting France for 22 years Britain settled on a strategy of offshore balancing and maintaining order in Europe enforced by the Royal Navy and a small expeditionary force. The initial goal was to prevent a revanchist France from regaining control of Europe. The architects were Prime Minister Lord Liverpool, Foreign Secretary Castlereagh, and the Duke of Wellington. The latter initially as the hero of Waterloo and later as prime minister. Their policies were enhanced by Lord Palmerston as both foreign secretary and prime minister.

Britain’s greatest fear was that a continental power could launch an invasion from the low countries. Hence it was crucial to keep France out of the Scheldt Estuary and the Port of Antwerp. When Belgium split off from Holland the 1839 Neutrality Treaty orchestrated by Palmerston kept France out. The result of that treaty and Britain’s troop presence in Belgium in 1870, kept both France and Germany out of Belgium during their war. This would not be so in 1914.

The linchpin of the strategy was the power of the Royal Navy whose goal was to be at least twice as strong as any two powers. Aside from a quantitative advantage the Royal Navy had the most technologically advanced fleet by taking advantage of steam power, screw propellers, gunnery, and hydrology. The Royal Navy truly ruled the waves and it enabled Britain to become a global power through its colonies, but for that power to be maintained there had to be an offshore balance in Europe.

For most of the 19^th century the policy succeeded largely because France was in a long-term relative decline while Britain was moving to its heights. However, after 1870 Britain entered into a relative decline in relationship to a newly reunified Germany. As a result, it required an alliance with France which severely limited Britain’s freedom of action. Britain learned the hard way in the trenches of France. Given all of Britain’s interest in Belgium, it is a wonder why Germany was unsure about Britain’s entry in World War I after it invaded Belgium.

Although Lambert discusses the 1815 Vienna settlement, he makes little note of Count Metternich of Austria whose interest in a stable Europe was greater than Britain’s. He also does not cite Henry Kissinger’s “A World Restored” on the Congress of Vienna. He also left out a discussion on the 1878 Congress of Berlin where British Prime Minister Disraeli played a leading role in settling, at least for a time, the Balkan question. There is way too much information in this book, and I would only recommend it to history nerds.

 

  

My Review of Dan Edelstein's "The Revolution to Come: A History of the Idea from Thucydides to Lenin"

 To the Barricades

 

Stanford Professor Dan Edelstein has written a very academic intellectual history of the idea of political revolutions. To the ancients up to the time of the French Revolution the whole idea of revolution was disturbing. It meant a useless cycle of destruction as society moved from tyrannical to mob rule with nothing being accomplished.

 

From Professor Edelstein I learned of Polybius a Greek historian writing in the time of the Roman Republic. Polybius endorsed the idea of a “balanced constitution” that distributed executive, legislative and judicial power, sounds familiar. His writings greatly influenced the founders of the American republic. Edelstein views the American Revolution as “radical conservatism” designed to “preserve the state.” This produced the American constitution which to the frustration of the extreme right and the extreme left forces policies into the center.

 

All of this changed with the French Revolution where the idea of progress took hold. The belief in progress meant that a revolution could bring about a glorious future and instead of having a balanced constitution it excused dictatorship in the hope that it would bring about a better world to come. To Edelstein, dictatorship was not an exception, but rather a feature of modern revolutions. Starting with Napoleon in 1799, to the Latin American caudillos of the early 1800’s, to Lenin, Mao, and Khomeini.

 

This is a hard book for the lay reader, but for those interested in the idea of revolution it is well worth slogging through.

My Review of Williamson Murray's "The Dark Path: War and the Rise of the West"

 War Through the Ages

The late Williamson Murray, a military historian at Ohio State, has written a tour de force history of war from the 1500’s to the present. He argues convincingly that the intense competition for the mastery of Europe led to advances in military technology and the infrastructure of war making were responsible for European success in mastering the globe.  His other thesis is that wars are not won by decisive battles, but rather by brute numbers, organization, economics, finance, and logistics. 

For example, Napoleon’s victory at Jena, which so impressed Hegel and Ludendorff’s victory at Tannenberg did not determine the outcome of the Napoleonic Wars and World War I, respectively. Napoleon lost because the coalition against him was far better organized and financed and had numbers on their side. Similarly, Germany and its allies lost world War I because with America’s entry into the war they were outnumbered and out financed. However, “time and chance happen to all” or in Clausewitz’s word “friction” and at times friction can overcome a lack of resources. For example, Ukraine is still in the fight, but it appears that heroic country was just sold-out by Trump.

Williamson discusses at length the various revolutions in military affairs. He starts with gun powder rendering castle walls obsolete and he goes on to discuss innovations in sailing that happened 100 years later that enhanced naval power. The most important revolution was the merger of the French Revolution with its levee en masse with the industrial revolution which made war total by making the civilian population enmeshed in warfighting. The flowering of that would occur in the American Civil War where the North was far better organized with far better logistics to overcome the South. The war lasted as long as it did because of poor generalship on the part of the North and better generalship on the part of the South.

If there is a hero in the book, it is Otto von Bismarck, whose strategic vision unified Germany with three wars. He had strategic focus and fully understood Clausewitz’s dictum, “that war is the extension of politics by more violent means.” Thus, the lack of strategic vision is road to ruin in wartime. For example, Bismarck understood that after victory against Austria he chose not seize any territory and that ultimately made Austria an ally.

For recent history Murray relies on the work of Andrew Marshall, the longtime head of the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment. ( A biography on Marshall was reviewed here: https://shulmaven.blogspot.com/2015/04/my-amazon-review-of-andrew-krepinevichs.html ) In that biography I noted, “As the Cold War was winding down in the mid-1980s he focused his attention on the rise of China and was quick to point out how the revolution in military affairs (precision weapons, computerized command and control and information warfare) in the 1990s would significantly change the nature of future battlefields.” Indeed, this is how Murray viewed Marshall’s work. Further Murray noted that Marshall was among the first to see the Soviets lacked the economic strength and the scientific bench to keep up with the U.S. in 1980’s, which highlighted the fact that war involves far more than kinetic battlefields.

Although “The Dark Path” is a long book, it offers a kaleidoscopic view of the history of war over the past 500 years. It is not for the casual reader, but for those interested in understanding how our world came into being, it is well worth the effort.