Showing posts with label Clausewitz. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Clausewitz. Show all posts

Thursday, February 13, 2025

My Review of Williamson Murray's "The Dark Path: War and the Rise of the West"

 War Through the Ages

The late Williamson Murray, a military historian at Ohio State, has written a tour de force history of war from the 1500’s to the present. He argues convincingly that the intense competition for the mastery of Europe led to advances in military technology and the infrastructure of war making were responsible for European success in mastering the globe.  His other thesis is that wars are not won by decisive battles, but rather by brute numbers, organization, economics, finance, and logistics. 

For example, Napoleon’s victory at Jena, which so impressed Hegel and Ludendorff’s victory at Tannenberg did not determine the outcome of the Napoleonic Wars and World War I, respectively. Napoleon lost because the coalition against him was far better organized and financed and had numbers on their side. Similarly, Germany and its allies lost world War I because with America’s entry into the war they were outnumbered and out financed. However, “time and chance happen to all” or in Clausewitz’s word “friction” and at times friction can overcome a lack of resources. For example, Ukraine is still in the fight, but it appears that heroic country was just sold-out by Trump.

Williamson discusses at length the various revolutions in military affairs. He starts with gun powder rendering castle walls obsolete and he goes on to discuss innovations in sailing that happened 100 years later that enhanced naval power. The most important revolution was the merger of the French Revolution with its levee en masse with the industrial revolution which made war total by making the civilian population enmeshed in warfighting. The flowering of that would occur in the American Civil War where the North was far better organized with far better logistics to overcome the South. The war lasted as long as it did because of poor generalship on the part of the North and better generalship on the part of the South.

If there is a hero in the book, it is Otto von Bismarck, whose strategic vision unified Germany with three wars. He had strategic focus and fully understood Clausewitz’s dictum, “that war is the extension of politics by more violent means.” Thus, the lack of strategic vision is road to ruin in wartime. For example, Bismarck understood that after victory against Austria he chose not seize any territory and that ultimately made Austria an ally.

For recent history Murray relies on the work of Andrew Marshall, the longtime head of the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment. ( A biography on Marshall was reviewed here: https://shulmaven.blogspot.com/2015/04/my-amazon-review-of-andrew-krepinevichs.html ) In that biography I noted, “As the Cold War was winding down in the mid-1980s he focused his attention on the rise of China and was quick to point out how the revolution in military affairs (precision weapons, computerized command and control and information warfare) in the 1990s would significantly change the nature of future battlefields.” Indeed, this is how Murray viewed Marshall’s work. Further Murray noted that Marshall was among the first to see the Soviets lacked the economic strength and the scientific bench to keep up with the U.S. in 1980’s, which highlighted the fact that war involves far more than kinetic battlefields.

Although “The Dark Path” is a long book, it offers a kaleidoscopic view of the history of war over the past 500 years. It is not for the casual reader, but for those interested in understanding how our world came into being, it is well worth the effort.


Friday, June 2, 2023

My Amazon Review of Hal Brands' Ed. "The New Makers of Modern Strategy...."

Thinking Strategically

 

Johns Hopkins professor Hal Brands has updated Peter Paret’s 1986 “Makers of Modern Strategy,” which in turn updated Edward Mead Earle’s 1943 version. It is a very long book consisting of 45 separate essays by different authors that runs 1168 pages. In my opinion this is way too long for the average educated lay reader. Nevertheless, there is much to be learned and I will highlight below a few of the essays that caught my attention.

 

Walter Russell Mead’s discussion of Thucydides is on the mark because it deals with the timeless question that the fear of a rising power (Athens) engenders in an established power (Sparta). I wish he spent more time on Graham Allison’s parallel thoughts on the U.S. vis-à-vis China. (Shulmaven: My Amazon Review of Graham Allison's "Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap" ) Matthew Kroenig’s essay on Machiavelli’s realism is spot on. Further he understands that despite Machiavelli’s bad rap, he was a republican at heart seeking to unify Italy. (Shulmaven: My Amazon Review of Philip Bobbitt's "The Garments of Court and Palace: Machiavelli and the World that he Made")

 

I was disappointed in Hew Strachan’s essay on Clausewitz. To be sure he emphasizes that war is the extension of politics by other means, but he is all to brief on friction, the fog of war and the center of gravity of the enemy. He does, however, mentions Col. Harry Summers’ Clausewitzian critique of U.S. military policy in Vietnam.

 

The essay by Charles Edel on John Quincy Adams’ realism hits the mark. Understanding the U.S. was not ready for the global stage, Adams utilizes the implicit support of the British navy to establish the Monroe Doctrine and further avoids direct U.S. involvement in the Latin American and Greek revolutions. At the time the U.S. could rightly only offer moral support.

 

I didn’t realize how influential Alfred Taylor Mahan’s treatise in sea power until I read John Maurer’s essay. Mahan’s influence extended well beyond the United States to Germany and Japan with global consequences. Robert Kagan’s essay on Woodrow Wilson casts him, not Theodore Roosevelt, as the architect of American global strategy for the 20th Century. Wilson comes off far more realistic than I expected as he protected U.S. interests at Versailles.

 

Nobel Laureate Thomas Schelling’s theories of nuclear deterrence and flexible response are examined by Eric Edelman. Schelling’s theories were in contradiction to the Eisenhower Administration’s massive retaliation response to potential Soviet aggression. One of the problems, as Edelman notes, is that sometimes the message you want to send is misinterpreted by the enemy, which is what occurred during the Cuban missile crisis. The Russians thought the embargo was a far bigger deal than how the Kennedy Administration viewed it.

 

Mark Moyar’s essay on U.S. strategy in Vietnam accuses the Johnson Administration of refusing to listen to its military advisors who wanted to go all-in at the start of the war. Simply put, gradual escalation failed. However, it is not clear that Johnson would have had the political support for what his advisors advocated. Nevertheless, this debate echoes to this day with the Biden policy with respect to Ukraine. Biden has been a gradualist, but ultimately, he is doing far more than what he thought practical at the start of the war.

 

I am glad that Dmitry Adamsky has given credit to Andrew Marshall, the long-time Pentagon guru of the net assessment project. If any one person has been the architect of U.S. military strategy in a networked age, it is Marshall. (Shulmaven: My Amazon Review of Andrew Krepinevich's and Barry Watts' "The Last Warrior: Andrew Marshall and the Shaping of Modern American Defense Strategy")

 

The book ends with a summation essay by Yale’s John Lewis Gaddis. It is a well thought out summary, but where he errs is that he gives too much credit to Franklin Roosevelt’s recognition of the Soviet Union as a strategic decision that would play out in World War II. To me, it is an ex-post rationalization where Roosevelt’s motivation had more to do with the hope of near-term trade deals.

 

I know I have only scratched the surface of Brands’ book, but if the reader puts in the effort there is much to be learned here.


For the full Amazon URL see: Thinking Strategically (amazon.com)

Saturday, April 28, 2018

My Amazon Review of Henry Lewis Gaddis' "On Grand Strategy"


Strategy Rules

 I wish I could take Yale history professor’s grand strategy course. Reading his book is the next best option. At the heart of Gaddis’ book is Isaiah Berlin’s parable of the hedgehog and the fox. Simply put a successful strategist has to have the strategic focus of a hedgehog with the tactical flexibility of a fox.  The strategist can’t view evolving events through the lens of a fixed ideological view and must be flexible enough to adapt to the changing environment. The enemies of flexibility are ego and hubris.

Gaddis teaches us that there has to be a relationship between means and ends. As the Rolling Stones taught us we can’t always get what we want. He continually invokes Carl von Clausewitz’s maxims especially that war is the extension of politics by more violent means. As such he understands Bismarck’s view the “politics is the art of the possible. So too is strategy.

Gaddis’ work here is also a paean to the liberal arts. He brings out the strategic thinking of Tolstoy, Saint Augustine and my personal hero Niccolo Machiavelli. He prefers intuitive thinkers over experts the latter of whom are more locked into rigid thinking. His favorite American strategists are Lincoln and Franklin D. Roosevelt. Lincoln understands how to use his technological and manpower superiority over the South by aggressively attacking in the Mississippi Valley and Roosevelt for understanding that the axis would be defeated by the factories of Detroit and California. Gaddis goes overboard, in my opinion, in giving too much credit for Roosevelt’s 1933 diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union as a harbinger of the World War II alliance with Stalin against Germany and Japan.  

As an aside I wish Gaddis would have discussed the grand strategies of Bismarck, Lenin and Stalin. All three were masters of tactical flexibility with very strong strategic goals.

So for those of us who can’t take Gaddis’ class, read his “On Grand Strategy.”