In “The Devils’ Alliance” British historian Roger Moorhouse delivers a highly readable account of the immediate aftermath of the Hitler-Stalin Pact of August 1939. His keen eye focuses in, not on the hows and whys the alliance was formed, but rather on how it operated to the advantages of both parties and how brutally efficient they both were in their respective occupation zones in Eastern Europe. He sheds much light on this aspect of World War II that few Western historians focus on. But it is certainly part of the history of Poland and the Baltic states.
He goes into great detail about economics of the deal in terms pricing and delivery of raw materials from Russia and capital goods from Germany. Though this sounds like boring stuff, he shows how the Germans lost patience with the Soviets nit-picking the terms of each and every shipment. Remember that at the outset, Hitler needed the deal more than Stalin, but after the German lightening victory in France, Stalin needed the deal far more than Hitler. It is no accident that Stalin occupies the Baltic States as France is falling. Hence we get a ringside seat to Molotov’s visit to Berlin in November 1940 which sets into motion a reorientation of Hitler’s thinking. As a sidebar the tactics used by Stalin in the Baltics in 1940 are identical to what Putin is using in the Ukraine today.
It is with the German victory in France and the subsequent German defeat over the skies of Britain that Hitler turns east and according to Moorhouse the flashpoint that ended the pact was the territorial division of the Balkans which was mostly outside of the initial deal. I think Moorhouse makes too much of the disputes in the Balkans, in particular the disagreements in the rather obscure Danube Commission. My guess is that Hitler’s decision to invade Russia was more on the level of grand strategy than a localized dispute.
Moorhouse puts to rest the myth that Stalin was surprised by the German invasion in June 1940. For the prior six months he spent practically every waking hour trying to avoid war and to get his armies battle ready for the coming onslaught. His problem was that he couldn’t mobilize for fear of giving Hitler an excuse to invade. Simply put he was practicing the very same appeasement policy that Britain and France followed three years earlier.
For the Amazon URL see: