In “The Devils’ Alliance” British
historian Roger Moorhouse delivers a highly readable account of the immediate
aftermath of the Hitler-Stalin Pact of August 1939. His keen eye focuses in, not
on the hows and whys the alliance was formed, but rather on how it operated to
the advantages of both parties and how brutally efficient they both were in
their respective occupation zones in Eastern Europe. He sheds much light on
this aspect of World War II that few Western historians focus on. But it is
certainly part of the history of Poland and the Baltic states.
He goes into great detail about
economics of the deal in terms pricing and delivery of raw materials from
Russia and capital goods from Germany. Though this sounds like boring stuff, he
shows how the Germans lost patience with the Soviets nit-picking the terms of
each and every shipment. Remember that at the outset, Hitler needed the deal
more than Stalin, but after the German lightening victory in France, Stalin
needed the deal far more than Hitler. It is no accident that Stalin occupies
the Baltic States as France is falling. Hence we get a ringside seat to
Molotov’s visit to Berlin in November 1940 which sets into motion a reorientation
of Hitler’s thinking. As a sidebar the tactics used by Stalin in the Baltics in
1940 are identical to what Putin is using in the Ukraine today.
It is with the German victory in France
and the subsequent German defeat over the skies of Britain that Hitler turns
east and according to Moorhouse the flashpoint that ended the pact was the
territorial division of the Balkans which was mostly outside of the initial
deal. I think Moorhouse makes too much of the disputes in the Balkans, in
particular the disagreements in the rather obscure Danube Commission. My guess
is that Hitler’s decision to invade Russia was more on the level of grand
strategy than a localized dispute.
Moorhouse puts to rest the myth that
Stalin was surprised by the German invasion in June 1940. For the prior six months he spent practically
every waking hour trying to avoid war and to get his armies battle ready for
the coming onslaught. His problem was that he couldn’t mobilize for fear of
giving Hitler an excuse to invade. Simply put he was practicing the very same
appeasement policy that Britain and France followed three years earlier.
For the Amazon URL see:
http://www.amazon.com/review/R1Z5B41TSAIUJB
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