Showing posts with label federal deficit. Show all posts
Showing posts with label federal deficit. Show all posts

Sunday, October 20, 2024

A Realigning Anti-Incumbent Election

I normally write my election outlook on the weekend before the election. (See my earlier commentary: Shulmaven: The State of the Presidential Race) However, this year, because of my travel schedule I am hesitantly putting it out now. When historians 20 years from now look back at the 2024 election they would note that a major political realignment between the two parties took place. (See: Shulmaven: Political Realignment is Here) Simply put, the Republican Party, by eating into the Democrats hold on Black and Latino voters, has put together a broad multi-racial working class party with a strong populist bent. This is a far cry from the business and country-oriented party of two decades ago. Lurking behind all of this is an ever-widening gender gap.


On the other hand, the Democrats have picked up voters from hitherto high-income business oriented suburban Republican voters, especially women. The Democrats are now firmly the party of the elites buttressed by Black and single women voters. The union-oriented lunch pail Democrat is a relic of the past. The Democrats are the party of women, and the Republicans are the party of men.


Part and parcel with the realignment is that the county is moving towards Trump on many issues, specifically on trade, immigration, and crime. Witness Democratic Senator Bob Casey praising Trump on trade. In contrast the country is moving towards Harris on the potent issue of abortion. It remains to be seen which dominates. What is really surprising is that the race is so close given that nearly all of the propaganda arms of the state are firmly in the Harris camp.


Further the global electorate including ours is in anti-incumbent rage. (See: Shulmaven: Incumbents Beware) This is crucial for both Trump and Harris. Whomever the electorate perceives to be the incumbent will lose. That is why Biden had to drop out. To be sure Harris is the incumbent vice president, but we have been living in the age of Trump for nine years. My guess is that the electorate will not want to witness another four years. The problem for Harris is that she is too tied to Biden, and she has yet to articulate a clear vision of the future. Her closing argument is that Trump’s narcissistic criminality has to be stopped.


The electoral college arithmetic for both candidates is challenging. For example, if Harris holds the “blue wall” states of Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin, and picks up the one electoral vote coming out of Omaha, Nebraska she will hit the 270 electoral vote magic number. However, if she loses one of those states, she going to have to make it up in North Carolina, Georgia, Arizona, and Nevada. Given today’s polls, which is doable, but difficult. At the end of the day the key to a Harris victory is her ground game. She has paid staff and volunteers everywhere, while Trump’s campaign is sorely lacking in this regard. At least to me, if Harris loses Pennsylvania, her biggest mistake would be not picking Governor Josh Shapiro as her running mate (See: Shulmaven: Kamala Harris Fails Her First Test with VP Pick)  and her failure to counter Trump’s attack on her position supporting federally paid for gender reassignment surgeries.


I also have a hunch that the election might not be as close as the polls suggest. It is equally likely that either candidate will receive more than 300 electoral votes. Stranger things have happened in the last two weeks of the election and if there is going to be a wave, I would give the edge to Harris. Recall that the polls were wrong in 2016, 2020 and 2022.


In keeping with my anti-incumbent thesis, I think the Democrats will retake the very dysfunctional House and end up with a majority of around 10-12 seats. On the other hand, the Democrats will lose the Senate with the Republicans ending up with 52 seats. Although most Senate Democrats are leading in the polls there are too many targets of opportunity for the Republicans.


Most disappointing about the election is that two particularly critical issues, the elephants in the room, are not being discussed. The first is the out-of-control deficit spending of both parties that putting the U.S. on the path of have highest debt/GDP ratio in history and the underspending on defense that will put our country at grave risk in the years ahead.

 

Thursday, March 12, 2020

"Corona Virus: Supply Shock and Demand Shock," UCLA Anderson Forecast, March 2020



This forecast was put together on March 1 and represented our thinking at the time. Subsequent to that the Saudi oil price war broke out and the COVID-19 pandemic intensified and the U.S. government policy response has been found wanting. Thus if we were to do the forecast today we would likely have declines in real GDP in the second and third quarters of this year.

The realization that the coronavirus known as COVID-19 has the potential to wreak havoc with the global economy hit the securities markets like a shock wave in the last week of February. Just as we thought that after the signing of the USMCA agreement and the temporary truce in the U.S.-China trade war would put both the U.S. and the global economy on the path to moderate growth in 2020 and beyond, we were struck with the realization that the public health emergency would morph into an economic emergency as portions of the Chinese, South Korean, Japanese and northern Italian economies began to shut down.

What makes COVID-19 different from the prior epidemics SARS (2002-03), MERS (2012), Ebola (1976- ) and especially H1N1 (swine flew of 2009-10 which killed 12,500 Americans alone) is that although less fatal, it is potentially far more contagious. It is in the contagious nature of COVID-19 that triggered the economic shutdowns that have become so disruptive to the global economy. Remember China is far more integrated into the global economy than it was during the SARS epidemic.

In the last week of February the U.S. stock market as measured by the S&P 500 decline by 11.5%, its biggest decline since the height of the financial crisis in October 2008; the yield on the 10-year U.S. Treasury bond dropped 35 basis points to a record low of 1.15% and oil prices plummeted. (See Figures 1, 2 and 3) As a result we tore up the forecast we were about to present and very quickly produced what you are about to read. And as a consequence take this forecast as an attempt to distill incomplete and rapidly evolving information into framework for making reasonable judgments about the future course of the economy.



Figure 1.  S&P 500, 1MAR19 – 28FEB20


Source: BigCharts.com

Figure 2. 10-Year U.S. Treasury Yield, 1MAR19- 28FEB20


Source: BigCharts.com

Figure 3. West Texas Intermediate Crude Oil – Front Month Contract,        1MAR19-28FEB20


BigCharts.com

We view the COVID-19 epidemic and likely pandemic to work as both a supply shock and a demand shock on the economy. It affects supply by shutting down factories making critical products and decreases demand for travel, hotel and recreational services. For modeling purposes we looked at the demand response to the 9/11 event in 2001 to get sense of the magnitudes. On the supply side we looked at the risks to automobile, clothing and capital goods production.

As a result we are assuming a two quarter hit to real GDP growth in the second and third quarters of this year with very modest increases of 1.3% and 0.6% respectively compared the 2% plus growth we previously forecast. (See Figure 3)  That would put 2020 growth on a fourth quarter to fourth quarter basis to a low 1.5%. You can view our forecast as the midpoint between the coronavirus having a very minimal effect to it causing a full blown recession. Time will tell.  Very slow growth combined with the ending of temporary employment associated with the 2020 census will lead to about a drop of 300,000 jobs in the third quarter. Thereafter we anticipate employment growth to resume. (See Figure 4) Concomitantly the unemployment rate is forecast to increase modestly from 3.5% in the first quarter to 3.8% in the third quarter. (See Figure 5) As an aside, do not be misled by the very strong 225,000 job gain reported for January which was influenced by unusually warm weather throughout the country. (See Figure 7)

Figure 4. Real GDP Growth, 2011Q1 -2022Q4, Percent Change, SAAR


Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Figure 5. Payroll Employment, 2011Q1 -2022Q4F, Change in Thousands, SA

  
U.S Bureau of Labor Statistics and UCLA Anderson Forecast


Figure 6. Unemployment Rate, 2011Q1-2022Q4F, Percent SA


Sources: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Figure 7. January 2020, Average Temperature Divergence


Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration


Monetary Policy to Become Super-Accomodative

Monetary policy is not a cure for COVID-19 nor a vaccine for COVID-19. It cannot reopen factories in China or Italy and it cannot convince frightened people to travel, but it might reduce fears that something worse could happen to the economy and might alleviate the pain of stressed business facing supply shortages. We expect that the Fed will cut its benchmark federal funds rate by a full 50 basis points in the second quarter, from the current mid-point of 1.625% to 1.125%. We do note that as of March 2 the futures markets were expecting cuts on the order of 75 basis points.

Figure 8. Federal Funds vs. 10-Year U.S. Treasury Bonds, 2011Q1 – 2022Q4F, Rates



Sources: Federal Reserve Board and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Further the balance sheet expansion process that the Fed undertook last September to solve a “plumbing problem” in the all-important repo market will, instead of winding down as planned, continue.( See Figure 9 ) Simply put the interaction between the Dodd-Frank regulatory regime and Fed’s reserve requirements left the system short of reserves. And although the reserve replenishment programs is not exactly like the three quantitative easing programs of the past decade, it sure looks like it on the chart.


Figure 9. Federal Reserve Bank Assets, 18Dec07 – 26Feb20, In $Millions


Source: Federal Reserve Board via FRED

At least in the short-run the Fed will be able to aggressively ease. Inflation remains quiescent and is likely to remain below its 2% target as measured by the consumption deflator. Here we chart the more familiar consumer price index which runs higher than the deflator.(See Figure 10) Further it is likely that the Fed will make its inflation target symmetric which means that prior undershoots will be offset by an overshoot in the inflation rate meaning that the near term target going forward could very well be 2.5%. Another wrinkle to Fed policy is the potential for Trump acolyte Judy Shelton to receive Senate confirmation for a seat on the Federal Reserve Board.  Put simply, she doesn’t play well with others. However the supply shock coming from COVID-19 and continued trade issues with China have caused many businesses to rethink their global supply chains into thinking more local. Thus over the long run de-globalization may work to increase inflation.

Figure 10. Consumer Price Index vs. Core CPI, 2011Q1-20122Q4F, Percent Change a Year Ago


Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Consumption Growth Slows to a Crawl and then Rebounds

Since 2014 Consumer spending has been the mainstay of the economy. However the shock of the virus will likely dampened consumer spending in the second and third quarters with growth stalling out at 1.3% and 0.7%, respectively. (Figure 11) Thereafter we expect a rebound with automobile sales lagging as a result of credit problems in that sector.

Figure 11. Real Consumption Expenditures, 2011Q1-2022Q4F, Percent
Change, SAAR


Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Housing Comes Alive

Although far from booming housing starts are ratcheting up on the order of 100,000 units a year. Instead of a previously forecast 1.25 million/year, we now envision starts to come in at somewhat above 1.35 million units a year. (See Figure 12) Rising income and the allure of 3.25% 30-year fixed rate mortgages are beginning to overcome the supply constraints caused by local zoning and do not forget that the low interest rate environment is bringing a torrent of money into the rental apartment market as investors hunt for yield in yield starved world. Indeed, in some states, local zoning restrictions are being relaxed and that in the long run will enable housing starts to return to its historical run rate on the order of 1.4-1.5 million units/year. Far from a boom, but much better than the recent history.

Figure 12. Housing Starts, 2011Q1 – 2022Q4F, In Thousands of Units, SAAR


Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census and UCLA Anderson Forecast

737-Max Deliveries to Rescue Business Fixed Investment

We are assuming that Boeing’s long grounded 737-MAX airplane will soon be certified to fly and deliveries will start taking place in the third quarter. Thus the full year decline in nonresidential fixed investment will soon come to an end. (See Figure 13) Those deliveries will likely offset the effects coming from the virus. If we are wrong here the outlook for the second half will decidedly worsen. Of course a lion’s share of the gain in fixed investment will be offset by a reduction in inventory levels. Just to note a good part of the recent weakness in this sector is coming from substantial declines in structures for the oil and gas industry as low oil and gas prices weigh on the decade long fracking boom.

Figure 13. Real Business fixed Investment, 2011Q1- 2022Q4, Percent Change, SAAR


Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Government Spending: The Good News and the Bad News

To look at the 3%+ real growth in federal government purchases (excludes entitlements) from 2018-2020 you would think the Democrats were in power, yet under a Republican administration we are witnessing dramatic growth in both defense and nondefense purchases. (See Figure 14) Contrast that to five years of annual declines from 2011-2015 under the prior Democratic administration. As a consequence instead of being a drag on real GDP growth, federal government purchases have been highly stimulative.

Figure 14. Real Federal Government Purchases, 2011Q1 – 2022Q4 F, Percent Change, Annual Data



Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce and UCLA Anderson Forecast


The bad news is that the party will likely end in 2021 as the growth in government purchases crawl to a halt. Here we that the increases in public health spending associated with the virus will not be substantial. Defense spending is peaking and assuming gridlock in Washington in 2021, nondefense spending will be under pressure, but nowhere near the budget cuts the Trump administration has proposed. Further as a result of the late 2017 tax cuts and the increases in spending, the federal deficit will exceed a trillion dollars a year for as far as the eye can see. (See Figure 15)

Figure 15. Federal Deficit, 2011 – 2022F, In $Billions, Annual Data


Sources: U.S. Office of Management and Budget and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Conclusions

The forecast presented herein represents our very preliminary estimate of the impact of the Coronavirus on the U.S. economy. For the time being we view our 1.5% forecast for real GDP growth on a fourth quarter to fourth quarter basis as a midpoint between a minimal effect and a full blown recession. At this stage it is hard to model out the full effects of the supply and demand shocks that are now hitting the economy. In response we anticipate that the Fed will cut its policy rate by 50 basis points from 1.625% to 1.125% and interest rates will remain low for the entire forecast period. The one bright spot in response to the low interest rates will be a much stronger housing market than we previously forecast. Of course it goes without saying that this year’s presidential election, like 2016’s, will increase the risk of untested economic policies being put into place in 2021.



Friday, September 27, 2019

"The Year of Living Dangerously," UCLA Anderson Forecast, September 2019


The Year of Living Dangerously[i]
David Shulman
Senior Economist, UCLA Anderson Forecast
September 2019

With his tweets of August President Trump escalated our trade war with China and attacked Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell as an “enemy.” All of this occurring against a backdrop of near recessionary conditions in Europe with the potential for a Brexit disruption, Brazil and Mexico, a slowdown in China, rising geopolitical tensions in the Kashmir, the Middle-East, Hong Kong and the Korean Peninsula and a very real slowing in the U.S. economy. It seems that we are sleepwalking into a recession and perhaps quite a bit more geopolitically.

Although we are not calling for a recession over the forecast horizon, as we have noted for over a year it is very likely that economic growth will stall in the second half of 2020 as the effects of the 2017 tax cuts wane and as trade tensions exact their toll on corporate investment. On a fourth quarter to fourth quarter basis we are forecasting real GDP growth of 2.1% and 1.2% in 2019 and 2020, respectively. Indeed in the second half of 2020 growth is expected to decline to 0.4%, not quite a recession, but pretty close. (See Figure 1.) For 2021 we forecast growth to return to 2.1%.














Figure 1.Real GDP Growth, 2011Q1- 2021Q4, Percent Change, SAAR


Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce and UCLA Anderson Forecast

What are we Worried About?

We are worried about the following:
·        The escalating trade war with China.
·        The weakening of business investment in equipment and structures.
·        The negatively sloped yield curve.
·        The slowdown in employment growth.
·        The inability of housing activity to launch.
·        The stagnant stock market.

We will discuss each of these factors in turn.


Trade Shock

At the recent Federal Reserve conference in Jackson Hole, Wyoming Fed Chairman Jerome Powell noted:


   “Moreover, while monetary policy is a powerful tool that works to support
     consumer spending, business investment, and public confidence,
      it cannot provide a settled rulebook for international trade.” (Emphasis
      added)

The reason why there is no rulebook is that we haven’t experienced a trade shock since the imposition of the Smoot-Hawley tariffs of 1930. We know how that turned out. Just after Powell made those remarks, President Trump weighed in with a substantial increase in the planned tariffs on Chinese goods (Increased to 10% and 25%, valued at about $80 billion/year) that are scheduled to go into effect on September 1st and December 15th.  As we have argued for two years tariffs are analogous to putting grains of sands into the gears of commerce which work to reduce output and increase prices.  Indeed a recent Fed study noted that trade uncertainty lowered real GDP growth about 1% in 2019 and projected another equivalent drop in 2020.[ii] And make no mistake American businesses and consumers will bear the brunt of the tariffs. And despite all of the Administration’s heightened rhetoric the real trade deficit will continue to rise as it approaches one trillion dollars this year. (See Figure 2)

Figure 2. Real Net Exports, 2011Q1 -2021Q4, Annual Data, $Billions

                                      
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Further the introduction of President Trump’s tariffs has greatly increased the uncertainty about the durability of existing supply chains thereby dampening business investment, more on that below. The Trump uncertainty is having pretty much the same effect of the uncertainties introduced by President Obama earlier in the decade with a multitude of regulatory changes coming from the Environmental Protection Administration, the Department of Labor and the Department of Energy.[iii]

Weaker Business Investment in Equipment and Structures

In response to the rise uncertainty the growth in business investment in equipment has stalled. After increasing at a solid 6.8% in 2018 real investment in equipment is forecast to grow at somewhat less than 2% from 2019-2021 and there will be several negative quarters along the way. (See Figure 3) The 11% increase in the first quarter of 2020 is based on our assumption that Boeing will resume shipments of the now-grounded 737-MAX in that quarter. Concomitantly real business investment in structures is already in declining at a 3% annual rate and that trend is forecast to continue through 2021. (See Figure 4)  Much of the decline is due to weakness in energy related investment especially related to oil and gas development in response to a 25% decline in oil prices.


















Figure 3. Real Business Investment in Equipment, 2011Q1-20121Q4F, Quarterly Data, Percent Change, SAAR

Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce and UCLA Anderson Forecast




















Figure 4. Real Business Investment in Structures, 2011Q1-2021Q4F, Quarterly Data, Percent Change, SAAR


Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce and UCLA Anderson Forecast

The Negatively Sloped Yield Curve

One of the most widely used and accurate signals of an oncoming recession is a negatively sloped yield curve where the return on short-term money is higher than the return on longer term money. Not only is a negatively sloped yield curve a signal of an oncoming recession it is also a cause because it eliminates the maturity transformation arbitrage profits of the financial system thereby reducing the willingness to lend. The indicator that the Fed uses is the difference between the yield on three month U.S. Treasury Bills versus the yield on 10-Year U.S. Treasury Bonds. (See Figure 5) Yes folks, we have been there since May. (See Figure 5). Aficionados on Wall Street prefer to use the difference between the 2-Year U.S Treasury Note versus the 10-Year U.S. Treasury Bond. That too turned negative in August.




Figure 5. Slope of the Yield Curve, 10-Year U.S. Treasuries minus Three Month Treasury Bills, Apr 1982 – Aug 2019, Daily Data, Percent



Sources: Federal Reserve Board via FRED

Although we have great respect for the signal coming from the bond market, we believe that the negatively sloped yield curve this time may sending us a false positive signal. Why? In the past then the yield curve was negatively sloped there was over-building in the housing market. This cycle, if anything, there has been under-building. As a result this time we might just skate by and avoid a recession.

Another cause of the negatively slope yield curve is the pressure coming from the global bond market. As of late-August there were about $17 trillion of negative yielding sovereign debt concentrated in Europe and Japan. (See Figure 6) With limited growth prospects, low inflation and aggressive buying from the European Central Bank European investors have little choice than to pay sovereigns a storage fee for their money. After all it hard to store a trillion euros under the mattress. As a result of the gravity coming from Europe the 10- Year U.S. Treasury yield has collapsed to 1.5%, about half of what it was last fall.







Figure 6. Selected Sovereign Yields, 30Aug19, Percent

Country
        
2- Year
10 Year
United States
1.990
1.50
France
-0.850
-0.40
Germany
-0.900
-0.71
Italy
-0.170
1.03
Japan
-0.310
-0.28
UK
0.400
0.49

Source: CNBC

Because the Fed is very knowledgeable about the yield curve and the contractionary forces coming from the trade war and European weakness, we believe that Fed has entered a significant easing cycle. Where the Fed Funds rate peaked at 2.625% last December, we now believe that the rate will be 1.625% by this December and a very low 1.125% by December 2020. The drop in the Fed Funds rate in 2020 will be the result of the economic weakness we forecast for later that year. (See Figure 7) Of course by then the yield curve will be positively sloped.















Figure 7. Federal Funds vs. 10-Year U.S. Treasury Bonds, 2011Q1 – 2021Q4F, Percent



Sources: Federal Reserve Board and UCLA Anderson Forecast

The Fed will be able to be aggressive in lowering rates because, although running somewhat above their target, overall inflation will remain benign. (See Figure 8) However we would point out that the imposition of tariffs means that there is upside risk to our 2%+ inflation forecast.










Figure 8. Consumer Price Index vs. Core CPI, 2011Q1- 2021Q4F, Percent Change a Year Ago




Sources: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Employment Growth Softening

In August the Bureau of Labor Statistics announced that the estimate for March 2019 payroll employment was overstated by 500,000 jobs. We will not how this preliminary estimate will translate in actual monthly job growth until we get the January 2020 data, but as a first approximation recent employment growth has been overstated by about 40,000 jobs a month. Our forecast for job growth is based on current data and therefore it should be viewed as high. Nevertheless instead the recent normal of job gains of 200,000 a month, we envision job growth in 2020 to be a tepid 70,000 a month. (See Figure 9)This eventuality will be a shock to those business that have relied on the recent history of job growth. We would also note that our forecast includes the temporary government hiring associated with the census, especially in the second quarter of 2020. Given our GDP forecast the unemployment rate will remain stable at around 3.6% through early 2020 and then rise to about 4% at the end of that year. (See Figure 10)

Figure 9. Payroll Employment, 2011Q1-2021Q4, Quarter to Quarter Change, In Thousands, SAAR

                                   


Sources: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and UCLA Anderson Forecast
















Figure 10. Unemployment Rate, 2011Q1-20121Q4F, Percent, SAAR


Sources: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistic and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Housing Activity Remains Sluggish

As we have noted ad nausea, post the Great Recession housing activity has failed to recover to what historically has been a normalized level of housing starts of 1.4 million – 1.5 million units. Activity has stalled out in the 1.2 million – 1.3 million range and we forecast that it will remain sluggish throughout the forecast horizon. Specifically we are forecasting 1.25 million units for 2019 and for starts to average around 1.2 million units in 2020 and 2021. (See Figure 11) This sluggishness is especially noteworthy in light of the fact that mortgage interest rates have declined from 5% in late 2018 to around 3.75% today.   What this means is that unlike 2007 housing activity is really not in position to trigger a recession this time around.





Figure 11. Housing Starts, 2011Q1-2012Q4F, Thousands of Units, SAAR




Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Stock Market Has Gone Nowhere Since January 2018

Although the S&P 500 stock index remains very close to its all-time high, as a practical matter stock prices haven’t gone anywhere since January 2018. (See Figure 12) We would note that in January 2018 the Trump Administration got very serious about imposing tariffs and in March 2018 the first round of tariffs on steel and aluminum were put in place. As a result the wealth effect associated with rising stock prices is waning.









Figure 12. S&P 500 Stock Index, 1Sep2017 – 30Aug2019



Sources: Standard and Poor’s via BigCharts.com


What seems to be OK?

Although there is much to be worried about consumption, which accounts for about two thirds of GDP is chugging along, federal spending is advancing smartly in response to the recent budget deal and businesses continue to invest in intellectual property at a heady pace. Spurred on by low unemployment and higher wage income real consumer spending growth remains solid with gains of 2.5% this year and 2.1% in in 2020 and 2021, albeit with 1% growth in the second half of 2020. (See Figures 13 and 14) To be sure the pace is off from the 3% recorded in 2018, but still quite respectable for this stage of the business cycle.  As a result, if you are going to tell a story about a recession in 2020 you would have to have consumer spending far weaker than we now have it.



Figure 13. Employee Compensation, 2011Q1- 20121Q4F, Percent Change Year Ago



Sources: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Figure 14. Real Personal Consumption Expenditures, 2011Q1- 2021Q4F, Percent Change, SAAR

Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Unlike earlier in the decade federal spending is now increasing at a 3% annual rate. (See Figure 15) As a result of the recently approved budget deal that increases both defense and domestic purchases the 3% growth rate established in 2018 will continue this year and into 2020 before stalling out in 2021. However we might be low for 2021 as a new Congress might aggressively respond to the weakness we expect to occur in late 2020.

Figure 15. Real Federal Purchases, 2011 – 2021F, Annual Data, Percent Change




Sources: Office of Management and Budget and UCLA Anderson Forecast

The flipside of higher government spending will be the prospect of trillion dollar deficits thorough 2021 and beyond. (See Figure 16) Although both the administration and the Congress do not appear to be interested in the deficit today the day will come when the deficit is interested in them.





Figure 16. Federal Deficit, FY 2011-FY2021F, Annual Data, In $Billions





Sources: Office of Management and Budget and UCLA Anderson Forecast

The one bright spot in business investment is the continuing growth in spending on intellectual property. That category includes, among other things, computer software, research and development expenditures and filmed entertainment. Unlike equipment and structures this sector is being driven by technological imperatives that extend well beyond the business cycle. Despite the slowdown we are forecasting real intellectual property spending will continue to grow robustly, albeit off the heady 8.4% forecast for this year. Specifically we are forecasting growth of 5.5% and 4.1% in 2020 and 2021, respectively. (See Figure 17)







Figure 17. Real Spending on Intellectual Property, 2011Q1-2021Q4, Percent Change, SAAR



Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Conclusion

Economic growth is dramatically slowing. The near 3% pace of over a year ago is now a memory with fourth quarter –fourth quarter real GDP growth for 2019 and 2020 now forecast to be 2.1% and 1.2% respectively. Further job growth will slow to below 70,000 a month, a far cry from the 200,000 plus we have been used to. The real risk is coming from the Administration’s high and erratic tariff policies and its potential impact on exports and business investment. As long has consumption remains firm we believe that the U.S. economy will avoid a recession next year, but nevertheless it will be “The Year of Living Dangerously.”

  


[i] With apologies to Peter Weir and MGM(Released in the U.S. in 1983)
[ii] See Caldera, Dario et.al, “Does Trade Policy Uncertainty Affect Global Economic Activity?” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Sept 4, 2019.
[iii] See Shulman, David, “The Uncertain Economy,” UCLA Anderson Forecast, September 2010