Showing posts with label Bernanke. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Bernanke. Show all posts

Monday, October 15, 2018

My Amazon Review of Howard Marks' "Mastering the Market Cycle: Getting the Odds on Your Side"


Understanding Cycles

Howard Marks of the very successful Oaktree Capital Management has written a way too long and very repetitive book on understanding market cycles. Where was his editor when we needed him/her? Nevertheless his “Mastering the Market Cycle” is an important book that will give disciplined investors great insight. Discipline is the operative word, because without it Marks’ insights are of limited value.

Marks cites five critical cycles: 1) economic, 2) profits, 3) stock market 4) credit and 5) risk. An investor has to know where we are with respect to each of those cycles and most important is the risk cycle which is determined by the psychology of investors. Simply put are they greedy or are they fearful. Although this sounds easy in theory it is very difficult to implement. For example it is very hard to be bearish when the whole world is bullish, this I know from experience, and conversely it is even harder to be bullish when the whole world is bearish. It is at the extremes where the most money is to be made and where discipline is most needed.

The problem with implementing Marks’ ideas is that it is difficult to know how long a cycle will go on. Marks’ cites Greenspan’s famous “irrational exuberance speech of late 1996, only to witness the late 90s bull market to roar on for another three years. Although Marks was brilliant in backing up the truck in the credit markets at the height of the Lehman crisis in 2008, even he admits it was a close run thing and his success was dependent upon the efforts of Paulson, Bernanke and Geithner in stemming its worst effects.

Putting Marks’ ideas to use today I find that the current economic upswing is much closer to the end than the beginning, profit growth is certainly peaking, the credit market is wide open to most borrowers on very favorable terms and aside from the past few days in early October most investors remain bullish after a ten year bull market that quadrupled the major stock market indices, and investors seem oblivious to global macro and political risks. Thus the way I read Marks it is at least time to be cautious and consequently a time to de-risk portfolios.

Making one last point, I wish Marks cited the late Hyman Minsky who noted that stability leads to instability and although he didn’t directly state the converse, instability leads to stability. That would be Marks in a nutshell. Although too long and too repetitive “Mastering the Market Cycle” is worth the read. There is much wisdom here.




Saturday, October 6, 2018

My Amazon Review of Ray Dalio's "Big Debt Crises"


The Pathology of Debt Crises

Ray Dalio runs the very successful $150 billion Bridgewater Associates hedge fund and he is more than qualified to understand the pathology of debt. His book offers up a template for understanding of how a debt crisis develops where early optimism leads to over-leveraging that can longer be serviced which leads to analyzing the appropriate policy responses to it and a great deal of pain for society as a whole. He also fully understands that once a crisis is in full train there can be very negative political feedbacks that can make things far worse.

To Dalio policy makers have to ignore, at least initially, the problem of moral hazard. That is bailing out the ones who were in up to their eyeballs in making the crisis. He was fully supportive of the banker bailout program which in his opinion and my opinion was necessary to save the system. Where I would differ is that once a crisis has past the critical phase, those responsible have to be held to account. One of the reasons why there is so much populism on the right and the left is that no major banker in the U.S. went to jail. That was unlike the savings and loan scandals of the late 1980s and the dot.com frauds of the late 1990s. Our pagan society needs ritual sacrifices to cleanse the system.

Where his book is most valuable is his discussion of the three major debt crises of the past 100 years:  Wiemar Germany 1918-24, the Great Depression 1928-1937 and the recent Great Financial Crisis of 2007-2011. He goes through each of those crises in great detail and in many cases on a nearly day-by-day basis. In the case of the recent crisis he includes his contemporaneous Bridgewater Daily Observations publication to get his thinking in real time. By doing this he puts you into the shoes of investors and policy makers as they scramble to make sense as to what is going on. In the case of the German hyper-inflation he notes that given all of the constraints that might have been the least bad alternative policy to follow.

Dalio credits the work of Bernanke, Paulson and Geithner in preventing the U.S. in falling into a second great depression after the failure of Lehman Brothers. However letting Lehman go in hindsight looks like a big mistake. However as I have written elsewhere letting Lehman go was analogous to killing the chicken to scare the monkey. He also credits the smooth hand-off between the Bush and Obama administrations which contrasted to the lack of a hand-off between Hoover and Roosevelt in 1933.

I have several quibbles with the book. In the Wiemar inflation he rightly notes that the assassination of highly respected finance minister Walter Rathenau made it more difficult for Germany to renegotiate reparations payments, but he ignores the untimely death of foreign minister Gustav Stressemann in 1929 who might have been able to ease Germany’s external debt problem. He further ignores the untimely death of New York Fed president Benjamin Strong in 1928, who in Milton Freidman’s view might have saved the U.S. from the worst of the depression. Dalio, although he mentions it, under-rates the Treasury’s gold sterilization policy in the mid-1930s that triggered the 1937 relapse into depression.

Dalio also ignores the role of Bridgewater during the crisis. After all Bridgewater was part of the problem in that it was very likely they were shorting mortgages, high yield debt, equities, and bank stocks while being long treasuries, the U.S. dollar and gold. How else could Bridgewater have made money in 2008? Lastly the book is too long, but read the three case studies with great care which are magnificent.


Wednesday, August 22, 2018

My Amazon Review of Adam Tooze's "Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crises Changes the World"


The World in Crisis

Columbia history professor Adam Tooze, an authority on the inter-war years, has offered up an authoritative history of the financial crises and their aftermath that have beset the world since 2008. He integrates economics, the plumbing of the interbank financial system and the politics of the major players in how and why the financial crisis of 2008 developed and the course of the very uneven recovery that followed. I must note that Tooze has some very clear biases in that he views the history through a social democratic prism and is very critical of the congressional Republican caucus and the go slow policies of the European Central Bank under Trichet. To him the banks got bailed out while millions of people suffered as collateral damage from a crisis that was largely made by the financial system. His view may very well be correct, but many readers might differ. Simply put, to save the economy policy makers had to stop the bleeding.

He starts off with the hot topic of 2005; the need for fiscal consolidation in the United States. Aside from a few dissidents, most economists saw the need for the U.S. to close its fiscal deficit and did not see the structural crisis that was developing underneath them. Although he does mention Hyman Minsky a few times in the book, he leaves out Minsky’s most important insight that “stability leads to instability” as market participants are lulled into a false sense of security. It therefore was against the backdrop of the “great moderation” that the crisis began.  And it was the seemingly calm environment that lulled all too many regulators to sleep.

The underbelly of the financial system was and still is in many respects is the wholesale funding system where too many banks are largely funded in repo and commercial paper markets. This mismatch was exacerbated by the use of asset-backed commercial paper to fund long term mortgage securities. It was problems in that market that triggered the crisis in August 2007.

The crisis explodes when Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy in September 2008. In Tooze’s view the decision to let Lehman fail was political, not economic. After that the gates of hell are opened causing the Bush Administration and the Federal Reserve to ask for $750 billion dollar TARP bailout of the major banks. It was in the Congressional fight over this appropriation where Tooze believes the split in the Republican Party between the business conservative and social populist wing hardens. We are living with that through this day. The TARP program passes with Democratic votes. Tooze also notes that there was great continuity between the Bush and early Obama policies with respect to the banks and auto bailout. Recall that in late 2008 and early 2009 nationalization of the banks was on the table. Tooze also correctly notes that the major beneficiary of the TARP program was Citicorp, the most exposed U.S. bank to the wholesale funding system.

Concurrent with TARP the Bernanke Fed embarks on its first quantitative easing program where it buys up not only treasuries, but mortgage backed securities as well. It was with the latter Europe’s banks were bailed out. Half of the first QE went to bail out Europe’s troubled banks. When combined the dollar swap lines with QE, Europe’s central banks essentially became branches of the Fed. Now here is a problem. Where in the Federal Reserve Act does it say that the Fed is the central bank to the world? To some it maybe a stretch.

Tooze applauds Obama’s stimulus policy but rightly says it was too small. There should have been more infrastructure in it. To my view there could have been more infrastructure if only Obama was willing to deal with the Republicans by offering to waive environmental reviews and prevailing wage rules. He never tried for fear of offending his labor and environmental constituencies. Tooze also gives great credit to China with it all out monetary and fiscal policies. That triggered a revival in the energy and natural resource economies of Australia and Brazil thereby helping global recovery.

He then turns to the slow responses in Europe and the political wrangling over the tragedy that was to befall Greece. It came down to the power of Angela Merkel and her unwillingness to have the frugal German taxpayer subsidize the profligate Greeks. As they say “all politics is local”. The logjam in Europe doesn’t really break until Mario Draghi makes an off-the-cuff remark at a London speech in July 2012 by saying the ECB will do “whatever it takes” to engender European recovery.

As a byproduct of  bailing out the banks and failing to directly help the average citizen a rash of populism, mostly of the rightwing variety, breaks out all over  leading to Brexit, Orban in Hungary, a stronger rightwing in Germany and, of course, Donald Trump. But to me it wasn’t only banking policy that created this. The huge surge in immigration into Europe has a lot more to do with it. Tooze under-rates this factor. He also under-rates the risk of having a monetary policy that is too easy and too long. The same type of Minsky risk discussed earlier is now present in the global economy: witness Turkey, for example. Thus it is too early to tell whether or not the all-out monetary policy of the past decade will be judged a success from the vantage point of 2030.

Adam Tooze has written an important book and I view it as must read for a serious lay reader to get a better understanding of the economic and political policies of the past decade.




Thursday, December 9, 2010

Risky Business, UCLA Anderson Forecast, December 2010

"In sum, on its current economic trajectory the United States runs the risk of seeing millions of workers unemployed or underemployed for many years. As a society, we should find that outcome unacceptable."
- Ben S. Bernanke, "Rebalancing the Global Recovery," November 19, 2010

With short-term interest rates already at zero, the measured inflation rate approaching zero and the unemployment rate stubbornly remaining near 10%, a deflation-haunted Fed decided to experiment with a policy characterized as quantitative easing. (See Figure 1) On November 3rd, the Fed announced that it would expand its balance sheet by $600 billion dollars over the next eight months by buying intermediate-term Treasury bonds. Its purpose was not so much as to increase bank reserves, which it will do, but rather to lower long-term interest rates and as a consequence raise asset prices, thereby stimulating consumption and investment.

The unstated goals of this exercise in money printing are to lower the exchange value of the dollar and to lower real wages by causing inflation to

Figure 1 Federal Funds vs. 10-Year U.S. Treasury Yields, 2005Q1- 2012Q4F

Source: Federal Reserve Board and UCLA Anderson Forecast

increase relative to money wages. The former set off a firestorm of criticism at the G-20 meeting in Seoul, Korea increasing the risk of growth-dampening trade policies and as for the latter, although a theoretically appealing way of lowering the unemployment rate, it’s hard to see how a lower real wage in the construction industry, for example, will stimulate housing construction. Nevertheless, from an aggregate perspective a path to a more fully-employed economy could very well be through the wage adjustment process. That process is well underway in many sectors of the economy with the growing use of two-tier wage contracts and mandatory furloughs.1

The risks associated with the policy are that by monetizing the Federal deficit, it could lead to far more inflation than the Fed forecasts; it could engender a dollar crisis that would make it far more difficult to fund our fiscal deficit and it could negatively impact the dollar as the world’s reserve currency. Obviously, the additions to the Fed balance sheet will make it more difficult to unwind the extraordinarily easy monetary policy of the past few years.

Nevertheless, we must be mindful of the fact that the Fed has a dual mandate from Congress, which in the words of Chairman Bernanke "are to promote a high level of employment and low, stable inflation."2 Simply put, the Fed, as a creature of the Congress, has to try to fulfill its mandate or face the political consequences. To be sure, there are many critics who believe that rather than increase employment, the Fed will increase inflation, but with fiscal policy constrained by high deficits and stalemated politics; the Fed is the only game in town.

To us, a real risk is that the policy doesn’t work in reducing unemployment thereby lowering the Fed’s credibility. Indeed, clear signs of the Fed losing some of its credibility where a sell-off in the bond market more than undid the interest rate declines that took place in September and October and a surge in the prices of globally traded commodities that took place in anticipation of the quantitative easing policy. In essence, market fears of future inflation and/or dollar weakness have offset much of the positive effects that were to come from rising bond prices
Although it wasn’t called quantitative easing at the time, the Fed followed a balance sheet expansion policy in the context of near zero short-term interest rates during the 1930s. Then Fed chairman, Mariner Eccles characterized the effectiveness of monetary policy as "pushing on a string."3 All it did was increase bank reserves without transmitting any stimulus to the real economy, much like today.

After all, from late 2007 to the present, bank reserves increased nearly 30-fold with minimal upside effects on the economy. (See Figure 2) That is why Chairman Bernanke is stressing the asset market channel rather than the banking channel to transmit monetary policy. Of course it certainly can be argued that reserve expansion put a floor underneath the economy preventing something far worse. But, we must keep in mind a Fed without credibility is a clear negative for the economy, think the 1970s. While a Fed with credibility certainly aided the 25 year 1982- 2007 boom.

Figure 2 Total Bank Reserves, 2007Q4 – 2012Q4F

Source: Federal Reserve Board UCLA Anderson Forecast

Our Forecast

Our view is that the new Fed policy will be modestly helpful and the most recent economic data have been encouraging. As a result, we have revised up both our real GDP and inflation forecasts from last quarter, but unfortunately even with jobs gains averaging 150,000 a month in 2011 and 200,000 a month in 2012, unemployment will remain above 9% through the third quarter of 2012. (See Figure 3) We expect that real GDP will grow at a 2% plus annual rate through the third quarter of 2011 and then ramp up to a 3% or so growth rate. (See Figure 4) With respect to inflation, we are less fearful of deflation than Chairman Bernanke and we expect consumer price inflation to be at or above the Fed’s informal 2% target by late next year. (See Figure 5) The higher apartment rents now being reported by the publicly traded apartment REITs will soon find their way into the consumer price index.

Figure 4 Real GDP Growth, 2005Q1 -2012Q4F

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Figure 3 Unemployment Rate, 2005Q1-2012Q4

Figure 5 Headline vs. Core Inflation,
2005Q1 – 2012Q4F
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Why with such high unemployment is economic growth so sluggish? Historically, steep downturns are followed by steep upturns, but not this time. As we argued last quarter and previously, the economy is suffering from a debt hangover that will require many years of deleveraging to recover from.4 Consumption growth, instead of running at an historical 3% rate is now slogging along at a 2% clip as consumers increase their savings rate to repair their tattered balance sheets. (See Figures 6 and 7) Furthermore, with real wages stagnant, debt constrained consumers do not have the wherewithal to go on a consumption binge. (See Figure 8)

In fact, the economy just might be suffering from a new version of Keynes’ paradox of thrift. In the 1930s, Keynes argued that whereas savings for an individual was a virtue, for an economy in recession it is a vice because if every household cuts back on consumption the entire economy remains mired in a slump. Today, however, with very low interest rates, consumers and pension funds have to save more and/ or increase their contributions to achieve their target stock of savings. Moreover, it goes without saying that those consumers who are already retired are being forced to cut back on consumption because of reduced interest income. Thus, one of the challenges facing the Fed’s quantitative easing policy is that lower interest rates could have the perverse effect of lowering consumption rather than increasing it.

Figure 7 Personal Saving Rate,
2000Q1 – 2012Q4F

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Figure 8 Employment Cost Index, Real Private Sector Wages and Salaries,
2000Q1 -2012Q4F

Figure 6 Real Consumption Growth,
2000 – 2012F

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Furthermore, much of the increase in consumption is going to imports. Where a year ago net exports were contributing to growth, it is now inhibiting growth. (See Figure 9) That is why a weaker dollar is necessary part of the adjustment process in that it would work to reduce imports and increase exports. (See Figure 10) Of course, the adjustment process would be made easier if China moved with greater alacrity with respect to the upward revaluation of its currency. Nevertheless, in order for net exports to structurally improve, the savings rate has to rise. Why? The U.S. now consumes more than it produces and borrows the difference from abroad. If consumption were reduced to equal production the savings rate would rise and the trade deficit would disappear.

Housing continues to be in the doldrums. We had hoped to see a meaningful recovery in 2011, but that has been pushed back into 2012. The near complete breakdown in the foreclosure paperwork process has dramatically slowed the price discovery process and introduced a new element of uncertainty. We are now forecasting housing starts to be 757,000 and 1,196,000 units in 2011 and 2012, respectively, compared to an estimate of 604,000 units for 2010. (See Figure 11)

The Restructuring of State and Local Government

Although most business cycles have similar characteristics, each cycle is different in its own way. In the current one instead of the state and local sector

Figure 9 Net Exports, 2005Q1 – 2012Q4

Figure 11. Housing Starts, 2005 – 2012F

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Figure 10 U.S. $ Trade-Weighted Exchange Rate

Sources: Bureau of the Census and UCLA Anderson Forecast
Source: IHS Global Insight and UCLA Anderson Forecast

gradually increasing throughout the business cycle, this time it is in decline. Simply put, the state and local government is now undergoing the same type of restructuring that the private sector has endured over the past two decades. As a result, we do not expect any meaningful growth in state and local spending over the next several years. (See Figure 12) That is to say, the tax base cannot keep up with the growth in public employee pension and Medicaid outlays and as a consequence other sectors of state and local budgets will be squeezed. This phenomenon will be reinforced by the election of a flock of new budget cutting governors last November. Over the long-run, the growth path of Medicaid and pension expenditures, of necessity, will be lowered.

Fiscal Imbalances Remain

As we noted earlier, high deficits are constraining the Federal government to engage in further fiscal stimulus. Indeed, the newly elected Congress might just be in the mood for fiscal consolidation on the spending side of the budget. As for the tax side, we are assuming for modeling purposes a tax compromise where all of the Bush tax cuts get extended for one more year and in 2012 high income taxpayers will see their tax rates rise. However, we caution a highly partisan Congress might fail to compromise on the tax issue leaving the economy vulnerable to a massive tax hit in January.

Figure 12 Real State and Local Government Expenditures, 2000 – 2012F

Figure 13. Federal Surplus/Deficit, FY 2000-FY2020F

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce and UCLA Anderson Forecast
Source: Office of Management and Budget and UCLA Anderson ForecastUCLA Anderson Forecast

Until Congress grapples with the long-term nature of our fiscal problems, we will be living a period of ongoing uncertainty with respect to taxation. The chairman’s mark of the Bowles-Simpson Deficit Reduction Commission offers a good start, but the politics don’t seem to be there for a meaningful solution. Congress does not seem to be in the mood to cut entitlements will raise taxes even if taxes are meaningfully reformed with lower rates and fewer deductions.

In the meantime, we forecast mega-fiscal deficits for as far as the eye can see. (See Figure 13) Thus, in our opinion, gridlock is bad. Without the two parties coming together there cannot be any meaningful solution to the long term fiscal imbalances we now face.

Conclusion

Despite all of the issues outlined above, the economy will continue to muddle through with modest growth and distressingly high unemployment. The economy is healing, albeit at too slow of a pace, but we forecast there will be an acceleration of growth in late 2011 that will gradually work to lower the unemployment rate. Inflation will pick up quicker than the Fed now expects and as a consequence the extraordinary policy measures taken will gradually be reversed and a gradual tightening cycle might begin in early 2012.

Endnotes

1. See, Uchitelle, Louis, "Unions Yield on Pay Scales To Keep Jobs," The New York Times, November 20, 2010, p.1
2. Bernanke, Ben S., "What the Fed did and why: supporting the recovery and sustaining price stability," The Washington Post, November 4, 2010.
3. Meltzer, Allan H., "A History of the Federal Reserve Volume 1, 1913-1951," (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), p. 62.
4. See Shulman, David, "The Uncertain Economy," UCLA Anderson Forecast, September 2010.

Monday, November 1, 2010

In the Washington Post, "Federal Reserve's, Bernanke's credibility on line with new move to boost economy"

November 1, 2010, P. 1

"The greatest risk for the Fed in taking this action is that it could extend the economy's funk by giving a sense that either no one is in charge or that the people who are in charge can't get it right," said David Shulman, senior economist at the UCLA Anderson Forecast. "The whole psychology of that could leak back into the economy."

Full URL - http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/31/AR2010103103818_pf.html

Saturday, January 23, 2010

The Idiots in the Senate

The United States Senate is full of complete idiots. With hooker-loving David Vitter(R-LA), primary-scared John McCain(R-AZ), and two sure losers this November on the Democratic side,
Barbara Boxer(D-CA) and Russell Feingold(D-WI) all coming out against the renomination of Fed Chairman Bernanke, something is really wrong. To be sure Chairman Bernanke is not without sin, too much monetary ease in 2003-4 and regulatory failures with respect to sub-prime mortgages, but he and a few others really did save our country from The Great Depression 2.0.

What are these Senators thinking? Voting against Bernanke won't save their hides, but should the nomination go down, watch out below for stocks, bonds and the U.S. Dollar. Even if these idiots don't care about the markets, at the end of the day, they are voting against job creation and for higher unemployment rates.