Showing posts with label TARP. Show all posts
Showing posts with label TARP. Show all posts

Wednesday, August 22, 2018

My Amazon Review of Adam Tooze's "Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crises Changes the World"


The World in Crisis

Columbia history professor Adam Tooze, an authority on the inter-war years, has offered up an authoritative history of the financial crises and their aftermath that have beset the world since 2008. He integrates economics, the plumbing of the interbank financial system and the politics of the major players in how and why the financial crisis of 2008 developed and the course of the very uneven recovery that followed. I must note that Tooze has some very clear biases in that he views the history through a social democratic prism and is very critical of the congressional Republican caucus and the go slow policies of the European Central Bank under Trichet. To him the banks got bailed out while millions of people suffered as collateral damage from a crisis that was largely made by the financial system. His view may very well be correct, but many readers might differ. Simply put, to save the economy policy makers had to stop the bleeding.

He starts off with the hot topic of 2005; the need for fiscal consolidation in the United States. Aside from a few dissidents, most economists saw the need for the U.S. to close its fiscal deficit and did not see the structural crisis that was developing underneath them. Although he does mention Hyman Minsky a few times in the book, he leaves out Minsky’s most important insight that “stability leads to instability” as market participants are lulled into a false sense of security. It therefore was against the backdrop of the “great moderation” that the crisis began.  And it was the seemingly calm environment that lulled all too many regulators to sleep.

The underbelly of the financial system was and still is in many respects is the wholesale funding system where too many banks are largely funded in repo and commercial paper markets. This mismatch was exacerbated by the use of asset-backed commercial paper to fund long term mortgage securities. It was problems in that market that triggered the crisis in August 2007.

The crisis explodes when Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy in September 2008. In Tooze’s view the decision to let Lehman fail was political, not economic. After that the gates of hell are opened causing the Bush Administration and the Federal Reserve to ask for $750 billion dollar TARP bailout of the major banks. It was in the Congressional fight over this appropriation where Tooze believes the split in the Republican Party between the business conservative and social populist wing hardens. We are living with that through this day. The TARP program passes with Democratic votes. Tooze also notes that there was great continuity between the Bush and early Obama policies with respect to the banks and auto bailout. Recall that in late 2008 and early 2009 nationalization of the banks was on the table. Tooze also correctly notes that the major beneficiary of the TARP program was Citicorp, the most exposed U.S. bank to the wholesale funding system.

Concurrent with TARP the Bernanke Fed embarks on its first quantitative easing program where it buys up not only treasuries, but mortgage backed securities as well. It was with the latter Europe’s banks were bailed out. Half of the first QE went to bail out Europe’s troubled banks. When combined the dollar swap lines with QE, Europe’s central banks essentially became branches of the Fed. Now here is a problem. Where in the Federal Reserve Act does it say that the Fed is the central bank to the world? To some it maybe a stretch.

Tooze applauds Obama’s stimulus policy but rightly says it was too small. There should have been more infrastructure in it. To my view there could have been more infrastructure if only Obama was willing to deal with the Republicans by offering to waive environmental reviews and prevailing wage rules. He never tried for fear of offending his labor and environmental constituencies. Tooze also gives great credit to China with it all out monetary and fiscal policies. That triggered a revival in the energy and natural resource economies of Australia and Brazil thereby helping global recovery.

He then turns to the slow responses in Europe and the political wrangling over the tragedy that was to befall Greece. It came down to the power of Angela Merkel and her unwillingness to have the frugal German taxpayer subsidize the profligate Greeks. As they say “all politics is local”. The logjam in Europe doesn’t really break until Mario Draghi makes an off-the-cuff remark at a London speech in July 2012 by saying the ECB will do “whatever it takes” to engender European recovery.

As a byproduct of  bailing out the banks and failing to directly help the average citizen a rash of populism, mostly of the rightwing variety, breaks out all over  leading to Brexit, Orban in Hungary, a stronger rightwing in Germany and, of course, Donald Trump. But to me it wasn’t only banking policy that created this. The huge surge in immigration into Europe has a lot more to do with it. Tooze under-rates this factor. He also under-rates the risk of having a monetary policy that is too easy and too long. The same type of Minsky risk discussed earlier is now present in the global economy: witness Turkey, for example. Thus it is too early to tell whether or not the all-out monetary policy of the past decade will be judged a success from the vantage point of 2030.

Adam Tooze has written an important book and I view it as must read for a serious lay reader to get a better understanding of the economic and political policies of the past decade.




Friday, January 22, 2010

In the Dow Jones Newswire, "Ex-Tarp Chief: Proposals Should Consider Broad Risk

JANUARY 22, 2010, 4:35 P.M. ET
UPDATE: Ex-TARP Chief: Proposals Should Consider Broad Risk

(Adds post-speech comments from Lambright in fourth paragraph.)
By Marshall Eckblad
Of DOW JONES NEWSWIRES

NEW YORK (Dow Jones)--The former chief investment officer of the U.S. government's Troubled Asset Relief Program said Friday proposals for overhauling the U.S. financial system should focus on limiting broad risks at institutions large and small.
Risk "could arise from lots of small institutions," said Jim Lambright, who left the TARP program last summer, at a financial services conference hosted by the Australian Consulate in New York.
President Barack Obama said in a speech Thursday he is committed to limiting the investment activities and risk levels of the nation's banks, and he also signaled the biggest banks could be forced to shrink.
Lambright didn't address any specific proposals in his speech. He said after the speech that he was challenging the audience to ask "where risks might migrate to other parts of the system."
Lambright was an appointee in the Bush administration under then-Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, but stayed on to work for the Obama administration.
David Shulman, a former executive at Lehman Brothers and now an economist at the UCLA Anderson Forecast, told Dow Jones Newswires on Thursday that any regulatory overhaul should include capital requirements for bigger hedge funds to prevent banks from being exposed to risk at less regulated firms.
-By Marshall Eckblad, Dow Jones Newswires; 212-416-2156; marshall.eckblad@dowjones.com

Source:http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20100122-712290.html?mod=WSJ_latestheadlines

Friday, November 6, 2009

Letter to The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 6

Don't Follow Failed Japanese Example

The new regulations allowing banks to classify underwater commercial real-estate loans as "performing" will create "zombie" banks that will plague our economy well into the next decade ("Banks Get New Rules on Property," Money & Investing, Oct. 31). These regulations mimic the failed Japanese approach of the 1990s and will, unfortunately, have the same effect. Simply put, weighed down with bad loans "zombie" banks don't lend.
Instead of restructuring real-estate loans, the underlying banks should be restructured through equity infusions from the public or with TARP funds, with the underlying real estate sold into the marketplace. Broadly speaking, that was the Resolution Trust Corp. solution of the early 1990s.
David Shulman
Berkeley Heights, N.J.
Mr. Shulman was head of real-estate research at Salomon Brothers from 1986 to 1991 and was senior REIT analyst at Lehman Brothers from 2000 to 2005.