Duel over Debt
On the surface it appears that only a history/economics nerd would read Jill Eichler’s book on the inter-Allied debts arising out of World War I. However, Eichler discusses that history through the lens of its two main protagonists, Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon (1921-1932) and Chancellor of the Exchequer Winton Churchill (1925-1929) It is through their eyes we see how complicated the debt duel was.
At the end of World War I the allies owed the United States something over $10 billion with the bulk of the borrowings coming from Great Britain and France. Simply put, the allied viewed the debt as a cost of winning the war and therefore did not have to be repaid, while the United States viewed the debt a commercial transaction that had to be repaid. Making matters worse was that the United States in 1922 passed the Fordney-McCumber Tariff which made it more difficult for the Europeans to earn the need dollars to repay the debt.
In the first round Mellon and then Chancellor of the Exchequer Stanly Baldwin renegotiated the $4.6 billion owed to the U.S. at 4.5% interest rate with a 25-year term, down to a phased 3% and 3.5% loan with a 62-year term in 1922. This took quite some doing on Mellon’s part to convince a recalcitrant Congress to accept the new terms. Nevertheless, Britain was very unhappy with the agreement and when Churchill became chancellor, he worked to further ease the burden. Later in 1926 Mellon negotiated a restructuring of the $4 billion French debt on easier terms than what Britain had agreed to. It took until 1929 for France to finally ratify the deal. France received better terms because Mellon viewed that their ability to pay was less than that of Britain.
Hanging in the background was the issue of German reparations. To Britain and France, the reparation was linked to the repayment of debt to the U.S., while the U.S. viewed it a separate issue. The Dawes Plan of 1924 which enabled U.S. loans to Germany which then were used to pay France and Britain who in turn paid the U.S... For full discussion of this and other inter-related issues see Liaquat Ahamed’s “The Lords of Finance” and Straumann’s “1931: Debt Crisis and the Rise of Hitler.” ( https://shulmaven.blogspot.com/2019/07/my-amazon-review-of-tobias-straumanns.html)
My criticism of Eichler is that she views the Dawes Plan in the light of history rather than how contemporaries experienced it. The Dawes Plan set off a boom in Germany and put Europe on the road to recovery in 1925. That along with the Locarno Treaty which established the borders of Western Europe engendered an uptick in confidence. That was true on the continent, but that was not true of Britain where Churchill returned to the gold standard and over-valued the pound at its pre-war level. Thus, Britain missed out on the boom. It was only with the 1929 stock market crash that the inherent flaws of the Dawes Plan became manifest. In the end most of the debts would never be repaid so it would have been much better had the slate were wiped clean in 1921. The world would be a much different place today had that happened.
Further, Eichler gives us a real sense of the high society that Mellon and Churchill moved in from London parties to excursions in Paris and the south of France. Three people in Mellon’s entourage would go on to bigger and better things. Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Russell Leffingwell would chair JP Morgan and the Council on Foreign Relations; Parker Gilbert who succeeded Leffingwell at treasury would go on to chair the Reparations Commission, and later Morgan Stanley (his son would also do that); and his son-in-law David Bruce would be an early hire in the OSS and later become a distinguished diplomat.
To sum up, Jill Eichler has tuned what could have been a nerdy story into an interesting history of some of the financial aspects of diplomacy of the 1920’s.