This forecast was put together on March 1 and represented our thinking at the time. Subsequent to that the Saudi oil price war broke out and the COVID-19 pandemic intensified and the U.S. government policy response has been found wanting. Thus if we were to do the forecast today we would likely have declines in real GDP in the second and third quarters of this year.
The realization that the coronavirus
known as COVID-19 has the potential to wreak havoc with the global economy hit
the securities markets like a shock wave in the last week of February. Just as
we thought that after the signing of the USMCA agreement and the temporary
truce in the U.S.-China trade war would put both the U.S. and the global
economy on the path to moderate growth in 2020 and beyond, we were struck with
the realization that the public health emergency would morph into an economic
emergency as portions of the Chinese, South Korean, Japanese and northern
Italian economies began to shut down.
What makes COVID-19 different from the
prior epidemics SARS (2002-03), MERS (2012), Ebola (1976- ) and especially H1N1
(swine flew of 2009-10 which killed 12,500 Americans alone) is that although
less fatal, it is potentially far more contagious. It is in the contagious
nature of COVID-19 that triggered the economic shutdowns that have become so
disruptive to the global economy. Remember China is far more integrated into
the global economy than it was during the SARS epidemic.
In
the last week of February the U.S. stock market as measured by the S&P 500
decline by 11.5%, its biggest decline since the height of the financial crisis
in October 2008; the yield on the 10-year U.S. Treasury bond dropped 35 basis
points to a record low of 1.15% and oil prices plummeted. (See Figures 1, 2 and 3) As a result we tore up the
forecast we were about to present and very quickly produced what you are about
to read. And as a consequence take this forecast as an attempt to distill
incomplete and rapidly evolving information into framework for making
reasonable judgments about the future course of the economy.
Figure 1. S&P 500, 1MAR19 – 28FEB20
Source: BigCharts.com
Figure 2. 10-Year U.S. Treasury Yield,
1MAR19- 28FEB20
Source: BigCharts.com
Figure 3. West Texas Intermediate Crude
Oil – Front Month Contract,
1MAR19-28FEB20
BigCharts.com
We
view the COVID-19 epidemic and likely pandemic to work as both a supply shock
and a demand shock on the economy. It
affects supply by shutting down factories making critical products and
decreases demand for travel, hotel and recreational services. For modeling
purposes we looked at the demand response to the 9/11 event in 2001 to get
sense of the magnitudes. On the supply side we looked at the risks to
automobile, clothing and capital goods production.
As
a result we are assuming a two quarter hit to real GDP growth in the second and
third quarters of this year with very modest increases of 1.3% and 0.6%
respectively compared the 2% plus growth we previously forecast. (See Figure 3) That would put 2020 growth on a fourth
quarter to fourth quarter basis to a low 1.5%. You can view our forecast as the
midpoint between the coronavirus having a very minimal effect to it causing a
full blown recession. Time will tell.
Very slow growth combined with the
ending of temporary employment associated with the 2020 census will lead to
about a drop of 300,000 jobs in the third quarter. Thereafter we anticipate
employment growth to resume. (See Figure 4) Concomitantly the unemployment rate
is forecast to increase modestly from 3.5% in the first quarter to 3.8% in the
third quarter. (See Figure 5) As an
aside, do not be misled by the very strong 225,000 job gain reported for
January which was influenced by unusually warm weather throughout the country. (See
Figure 7)
Figure 4. Real GDP Growth, 2011Q1
-2022Q4, Percent Change, SAAR
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce and
UCLA Anderson Forecast
Figure 5. Payroll Employment, 2011Q1
-2022Q4F, Change in Thousands, SA
U.S Bureau of Labor Statistics and UCLA
Anderson Forecast
Figure 6. Unemployment Rate,
2011Q1-2022Q4F, Percent SA
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
and UCLA Anderson Forecast
Figure 7. January 2020, Average
Temperature Divergence
Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration
Monetary
Policy to Become Super-Accomodative
Monetary
policy is not a cure for COVID-19 nor a vaccine for COVID-19. It cannot reopen factories in China or Italy and it
cannot convince frightened people to travel, but it might reduce fears that
something worse could happen to the economy and might alleviate the pain of
stressed business facing supply shortages. We
expect that the Fed will cut its benchmark federal funds rate by a full 50
basis points in the second quarter, from the current mid-point of 1.625% to
1.125%. We do note that as of March 2 the futures markets were expecting
cuts on the order of 75 basis points.
Figure 8. Federal Funds vs. 10-Year U.S.
Treasury Bonds, 2011Q1 – 2022Q4F, Rates
Sources: Federal Reserve Board and UCLA
Anderson Forecast
Further the balance sheet expansion
process that the Fed undertook last September to solve a “plumbing problem” in
the all-important repo market will, instead of winding down as planned,
continue.( See Figure 9 ) Simply put the interaction between the Dodd-Frank
regulatory regime and Fed’s reserve requirements left the system short of reserves.
And although the reserve replenishment programs is not exactly like the three
quantitative easing programs of the past decade, it sure looks like it on the
chart.
Figure 9. Federal Reserve Bank Assets,
18Dec07 – 26Feb20, In $Millions
Source: Federal Reserve Board via FRED
At least in the short-run the Fed will
be able to aggressively ease. Inflation remains quiescent and is likely to
remain below its 2% target as measured by the consumption deflator. Here we
chart the more familiar consumer price index which runs higher than the
deflator.(See Figure 10) Further it is
likely that the Fed will make its inflation target symmetric which means that
prior undershoots will be offset by an overshoot in the inflation rate meaning
that the near term target going forward could very well be 2.5%. Another
wrinkle to Fed policy is the potential for Trump acolyte Judy Shelton to
receive Senate confirmation for a seat on the Federal Reserve Board. Put simply, she doesn’t play well with
others. However the supply shock coming from COVID-19 and continued trade
issues with China have caused many businesses to rethink their global supply
chains into thinking more local. Thus
over the long run de-globalization may work to increase inflation.
Figure 10. Consumer Price Index vs. Core
CPI, 2011Q1-20122Q4F, Percent Change a Year Ago
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics and
UCLA Anderson Forecast
Consumption
Growth Slows to a Crawl and then Rebounds
Since 2014 Consumer spending has been
the mainstay of the economy. However the shock of the virus will likely
dampened consumer spending in the second and third quarters with growth
stalling out at 1.3% and 0.7%, respectively. (Figure 11) Thereafter we expect a
rebound with automobile sales lagging as a result of credit problems in that
sector.
Figure 11. Real Consumption
Expenditures, 2011Q1-2022Q4F, Percent
Change, SAAR
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce and
UCLA Anderson Forecast
Housing
Comes Alive
Although far from booming housing starts
are ratcheting up on the order of 100,000 units a year. Instead of a previously
forecast 1.25 million/year, we now envision starts to come in at somewhat above
1.35 million units a year. (See Figure 12) Rising income and the allure of
3.25% 30-year fixed rate mortgages are beginning to overcome the supply
constraints caused by local zoning and do not forget that the low interest rate
environment is bringing a torrent of money into the rental apartment market as
investors hunt for yield in yield starved world. Indeed, in some states, local
zoning restrictions are being relaxed and that in the long run will enable
housing starts to return to its historical run rate on the order of 1.4-1.5
million units/year. Far from a boom, but much better than the recent history.
Figure 12. Housing Starts, 2011Q1 –
2022Q4F, In Thousands of Units, SAAR
Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census and
UCLA Anderson Forecast
737-Max
Deliveries to Rescue Business Fixed Investment
We are assuming that Boeing’s long
grounded 737-MAX airplane will soon be certified to fly and deliveries will
start taking place in the third quarter. Thus the full year decline in
nonresidential fixed investment will soon come to an end. (See Figure 13) Those
deliveries will likely offset the effects coming from the virus. If we are
wrong here the outlook for the second half will decidedly worsen. Of course a
lion’s share of the gain in fixed investment will be offset by a reduction in
inventory levels. Just to note a good part of the recent weakness in this
sector is coming from substantial declines in structures for the oil and gas
industry as low oil and gas prices weigh on the decade long fracking boom.
Figure 13. Real Business fixed
Investment, 2011Q1- 2022Q4, Percent Change, SAAR
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce and
UCLA Anderson Forecast
Government
Spending: The Good News and the Bad News
To look at the 3%+ real growth in
federal government purchases (excludes entitlements) from 2018-2020 you would
think the Democrats were in power, yet under a Republican administration we are
witnessing dramatic growth in both
defense and nondefense purchases. (See Figure 14) Contrast that to five years
of annual declines from 2011-2015 under the prior Democratic administration. As
a consequence instead of being a drag on real GDP growth, federal government
purchases have been highly stimulative.
Figure 14. Real Federal Government
Purchases, 2011Q1 – 2022Q4 F, Percent Change, Annual Data
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce and
UCLA Anderson Forecast
The bad news is that the party will
likely end in 2021 as the growth in government purchases crawl to a halt. Here
we that the increases in public health spending associated with the virus will
not be substantial. Defense spending is peaking and assuming gridlock in
Washington in 2021, nondefense spending will be under pressure, but nowhere
near the budget cuts the Trump administration has proposed. Further as a result
of the late 2017 tax cuts and the increases in spending, the federal deficit will exceed a trillion dollars a year for as far as
the eye can see. (See Figure 15)
Figure 15. Federal Deficit, 2011 –
2022F, In $Billions, Annual Data
Sources: U.S. Office of Management and
Budget and UCLA Anderson Forecast
Conclusions
The forecast presented herein represents
our very preliminary estimate of the impact of the Coronavirus on the U.S.
economy. For the time being we view our
1.5% forecast for real GDP growth on a fourth quarter to fourth quarter basis
as a midpoint between a minimal effect and a full blown recession. At this
stage it is hard to model out the full effects of the supply and demand shocks
that are now hitting the economy. In response we anticipate that the Fed will
cut its policy rate by 50 basis points from 1.625% to 1.125% and interest rates
will remain low for the entire forecast period. The one bright spot in response
to the low interest rates will be a much stronger housing market than we
previously forecast. Of course it goes without saying that this year’s
presidential election, like 2016’s, will increase the risk of untested economic
policies being put into place in 2021.