Showing posts with label capital spending. Show all posts
Showing posts with label capital spending. Show all posts

Saturday, October 15, 2022

The Economist Joins Shulmaven in Forecasting Regime Change

The October 8th Economist titles its lead article “Regime Change” where it forecasts a pivotal moment for global economic policy that calls for a much tighter monetary policy combined with a much looser fiscal policy. (See: Regime change | Oct8th 2022 | The Economist, Paywall.)  The article notes that the monetary authorities will have a difficult time bringing down inflation to their 2% target and, as a result, a more relaxed 4% target would be in order. The author also believes that the savings glut of the past two decades will return in the post-Covid environment.

 

Although we completely agree that a regime change is coming which is being signaled by the global bear market in stocks and bonds, our regime is far different from theirs. (See: Shulmaven:The U.S. Economy is Entering a New Thirteen Year Cycle and Shulmaven:Higher Inflation and Higher Interest Rates: Get Used to it )  In our regime, far from having excess savings, we envision a capital spending boom based on deglobalization, energy transition, and climate resilience. Economists have under-estimated the deflationary effects of the globalization of the economy over the past three decades. Those effects are now going into reverse thereby undoing the salutary effects of the international division of labor.

 

Further inflationary pressure will come from a demographically based shortage of labor and real wages catching up from the 3+% decline in the U.S. that occurred this past year. Throw in rising defense spending and you have a formula for higher inflation and with that a structural rise in interest rates. Although we and The Economist end up with higher inflation, we get there in a far different way.

 

 

Monday, September 12, 2022

Higher Inflation and Higher Interest Rates: Get Used to it

Last May I wrote that our economy is entering a new thirteen year cycle that would be characterized by higher inflation and higher interest rates. (See:Shulmaven: The U.S. Economy is Entering a New Thirteen Year Cycle ) In that post we noted that the forces of deglobalization and decarbonization were inherently inflationary which would increase the demand for capital, and hence real interest rates. Whether or not there was a global savings glut, the demand for capital would mop up whatever excess savings there is.

In this post we add a third factor. Real wages have collapsed as inflation of 8% has swamped wage gains of 5%. Trust me, there is going to be a catch up which will put pressure and corporate margins and pricing. This will hardly make for a good environment for both interest rates and stock prices. 

Further although money growth has slowed dramatically over the past year, the 25% annual rate of increase in M2 over 2020 and 2021 will provide more than enough fuel to ratify the price increases that are coming.  As a result instead of having the wind at its back, the Fed will find it increasingly difficult to bring inflation down to its 2% target.

Sunday, February 28, 2021

Roaring 20's or That 70's Show

 With the 50 basis point backup in 10-Year U.S. Treasury yields over the first two months of the year the stock market has reached a critical juncture. As readers of this blog know, I have been bullish on stock prices for over a year ago ( See: Shulmaven: The Fed Green Lights the Stock Market ) largely based on the fact that interest rates will stay lower for longer. That assumption is now under challenge as I believe the markets now rightly believe that inflation will not be as quiescent as it has been over the past decade. To be sure I wrote about asset price inflation leading to consumer price inflation in January (See: Shulmaven: "Is the Pandemic Hiding Future Inflation," UCLA Economic Letter, January 2021), but we are now witnessing dramatic price increases in copper, oil and lumber and across a spectrum of producer prices. 

Meanwhile the Biden Administration continues to push for its extravagant $1.9 trillion relief/stimulus program and the Fed continues to support 25% year-over-year M2 growth, more than twice the peak rate of the great financial crisis. This is a formula for higher inflation and yes, higher interest rates that could work to engender a low level 1970's style stagflation.

To be sure that is a risk, but my sense is that what the stock market has been telling us all year that it isn't only interest rates that have been driving stock prices. In my opinion, assuming the Biden Administration is successful with a major infrastructure program that will complement the coming corporate capital spending boom I envision, profits will soar. Indeed corporate spending will concentrate on the electrification of the economy, hardening the grid, insourcing of critical supplies to make the economy more resilient, and hardening the IT infrastructure. All of this will be going on concurrently with a suburban housing boom. Net net, it is my belief that the 20's will roar, at least in the early part.

As a result the demand for capital will be high, interest rates will rise faster than what the market now expects and concomitantly price-earnings multiples will contract. So instead of the 22-25 times earning multiples hypothesized, future multiples will be on the order of 18-21 times earnings. Not so bad, but the risk remains that later in the decade we will see the reemergence of a less than benign interest rate and inflation outlook. 

Friday, June 15, 2018

"Interest Rates Move to the Center Stage," UCLA Anderson Forecast, June 2018


Interest Rates Move to the Center Stage

David Shulman
Senior Economist
UCLA Anderson Forecast
June 2018

The era of ultra-low interest rates is behind us. With the yield on the 10-year U.S. Treasury Note surpassing 3% and with the Federal Reserve set to push up the Fed Funds rate above 2%, interest rates are well on their path to normalization. (See Figure 1) To be sure, we are not forecasting yields to reach their pre-crisis levels of 5%+ for both short-term and long-term rates, but a Fed Funds rate north of 3% and a 10-Year Treasury yield north of 4% for late 2019 will seem awfully high compared to the past decade.

Figure 1. Federal Funds vs. 10-Year U.S. Treasury Bonds, 2008Q1 -2020Q4F
Description: FIG1.EMF
Sources: Federal Reserve Board and UCLA Anderson Forecast
The rise in rates is being propelled by high inflation, higher wages, an exploding federal deficit and the quantitative tightening policy adopted by the Federal Reserve.  An added wrinkle is the sale of fixed income securities by corporations utilizing their newly repatriated cash to buy back stock.

The Italian Job

Our interest rate forecast is largely based on domestic considerations. Now, all of a sudden, a political crisis involving the Euro in Italy along with monetary problems in Argentina and Turkey has triggered a flight to quality causing 10-Year treasury yields to plummet 30 basis points from 3.1% to 2.8% over a two week period. The flight to quality can best be seen in the Euro-area bond markets where over a four week period ending May 29, Italian 10-Year yields spiked by 138 basis points from 1.8% to 3.18% while German yields were cut in half dropping from 58 basis points to 26 basis points.  However, markets calmed down the next day. At this point we do not know how this will work out and it will largely be dependent on the Italian electorate’s position on the Euro. If the electorate decides to leave, we will face a currency/solvency crisis in the heart of Europe bringing with it even lower yields. While if the Italians decide to stay, yields will quickly snap back to where they were before. Because we do not view ourselves as experts on Italian politics we will stick to our U.S. interest rate forecast based on domestic considerations. Recall post-Brexit after dropping precipitously in the summer of 2016, markets quickly normalized.

The Domestic Backdrop for Higher U.S. Interest Rates

With year-over-year inflation as measured by the consumer price index already exceeding 2% and likely to be in the 2.5%-3% range over the forecast period, real bond yields, instead of being negative, will run in the 1%-2% range. (See Figure 2) Further, with the economy operating at full employment, wage increases will break out of the 2.5% recent growth rate to approach 4%. (See Figure 3)


Figure 2. Consumer Price index vs. Core CPI, 2008Q1 -2020Q4F
Description: FIG2.EMF


Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Figure 3. Employee Compensation, 2008Q1 – 2020Q4F
Description: FIG3.EMF
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Further upward pressure on interest rates will come from the Fed’s policy of quantitative tightening as it continues its course to reduce its balance sheet from approximately $4.4 trillion to about $2.8 trillion over the next few years. Thus, instead of buying bonds as it did during 2008 – 2015, the Fed has become a net seller. (See Figure 4) Adding to the supply is the Trump Administration’s all-out fiscal policy of spending hikes and tax cuts layered on a fully employed economy. As a consequence, the federal deficit is forecast to increase from $666 billion in 2017 to $1.06 trillion in 2020. (See Figure 5)

Figure 4. Federal Reserve Assets, 2006 – 23May2018, In $Billions

Description: C:\Users\David\Pictures\Federal Reserve Assets.png


Source: Federal Reserve Board



Figure 5. Federal Deficit, FY 2008 – FY 2020F
Description: FIG5.EMF
Sources: Office of Management and Budget and UCLA Anderson Forecast

The 3-2-1 Economy

Although we expect real GDP growth to pick up to 3%+ for the balance of the year, up from the first quarter’s 2.3% pace, we expect growth to fade in 2019 and 2020 as higher interest rates take their toll. In round numbers on a fourth quarter-to-fourth quarter basis, think of the economy growing at 3% in 2018, 2% in 2019 and 1% in 2020. (See Figure 6) Another way of looking at it is that a fully employed economy has difficulty growing without substantial increases in productivity.

Figure 6. Real GDP Growth, 2008Q1 -2020Q4F
Description: FIG6.EMF
Sources: Department of Commerce and UCLA Anderson Forecast

As the economy bumps against its full employment ceiling, job growth will noticeably decelerate over the forecast horizon. For example, employment growth averaged 200,000 jobs/month in 2017; it will average 133,000/month for the remainder of this year and then decline to 85,000/month and 60,000/month in 2019 and 2020, respectively. (See Figure 7) Concomitantly, the unemployment rate will decline from its current 3.9% to 3.4% in mid-2019 and then gradually return to 3.9% by the end of 2020. (See Figure 8)

Figure 7. Payroll Employment, 2008Q1 – 20120Q4, In Millions, SA
Description: FIG7.EMF










Figure 8. Unemployment Rate, 2008Q -2020Q4F, SAAR
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Business Investment Drives the Bus

Spurred by a major reduction in corporate tax rates, 100% expensing for equipment purchases and deregulatory policies coming out of Washington, D.C., we forecast business investment to continue to be the driving force in the economy. For both 2018 and 2019, we forecast real investment in both business equipment and structures to increase at an approximate 7% clip. (See Figures 9 and 10) However, growth will slow in 2020 as the effects of 100% expensing wane.

Figure 9. Real Equipment Spending, 2008Q1 – 2020Q4F
Description: FIG9.EMF
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Figure 10. Real Investment in Business Structures, 2008Q1 -2020Q4Description: FIG10.EMF
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Housing Activity Growing, but Less than Robust

Housing activity has been the great disappointment of the economic recovery and expansion that began in 2009. To be sure, housing starts have more than doubled off their moribund lows of 2009-2011, but still remain well below their long-term average and a far cry from the earlier boom periods.[1]  Specifically, we are forecasting housing starts to increase from 1.21 million units in 2017 to 1.34 million units and 1.40 million units in 2018 and 2019, respectively. (See Figure 11) However, we see housing starts declining in 2020 to 1.36 million units as the lagged effects of higher interest rates and a slowing economy inhibit new construction.

Figure 11. Housing Starts, 2008Q1 -2020Q4F
Description: FIG11.EMF
Sources: Bureau of the Census and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Trade Remains the Biggest Downside Risk

Despite all of the bluster, some of which is legitimate, coming out of the Trump Administration decrying the U.S. trade deficit, the trade deficit, in terms of real net exports, is forecast to increase from $622 billion in 2017 to $814 billion in 2020. (See Figure 12) Why? The trade deficit is the result of the U.S. consuming more than it produces which is the result of a very low national savings rate. Thus, in order to reduce the deficit, the U.S. has to save more and/or produce more domestically. Over the near-term it is hard to produce more, but the high deficit fiscal policy of the Trump Administration reduces national savings requiring us to import more. All the Trump Administration can do is move around the trade deficit among our import partners.

Figure 12. Real Net Exports, 2008Q1 -2020Q4F
Description: FIG12.EMF
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce and UCLA Anderson Forecast

The risk to the forecast is that with all of the talk about a trade war with China and repealing NAFTA, we can sleepwalk into a serious economic accident. For example, in 2017 the U.S. imported a total of over $1.3 trillion dollars of goods from China, Mexico, Canada, Japan and Germany. (See Figure 13) A trade war implies higher tariffs and non-tariff barriers that work as a tax on the American people that would raise prices and restrict output. That is hardly the recipe for economic growth. And because it is hard for import using industries to shift sources in the short-run, there exists the threat of very real economic dislocations. Put bluntly, the administration is playing with fire and the recent nervousness in the stock market is beginning to reflect the risks associated with a trade war.


Figure 13.
Description: How Trade Tensions Will Test Companies and Investors



Source: Barrons

Conclusion

The U.S. economy is leaving behind a very long period of ultra-low interest rates. Interest rates are in the process of normalizing with 10-year U.S Treasury yields reaching 4% and the Fed Funds rate surpassing 3% as economic growth accelerates and inflation exceeds the Fed’s magic 2% level. High fiscal deficits and the Fed’s quantitative tightening policy will put upward pressure on interest rates. Meantime, the economy, spurred by strong business investment, should grow 3% this year. However, growth will slow as the economy bumps against its full employment ceiling and high interest rates work to slow housing in late 2019 and 2020. Our simplified view is that we are in a 3-2-1 economy with growth on a fourth quarter-to-fourth quarter basis will be roughly 3% in 2018, 2% in 2019 and 1% in 2020.  The two major downside risks to the forecast is the potential for a trade war to break out with one or more of our major trading partners and for the uncertainty around Italian politics to broaden into a full-blown Euro-area crisis.



[1] See Shulman, David, “The Best of Times and the Worst of Times for Housing,” UCLA Anderson Forecast, June 2018