Confirmation Bias
Veteran Israeli journalists
Yaakov Katz and Amir Bohbot have put together a well-sourced and deeply researched
indictment of the vaunted Israeli intelligence services and Prime minister
Binyamin Netanyahu in their failure to anticipate the deadly Hamas attack of
October 7, 2023. In the bluntest of terms, they were guilty of confirmation
bias in which their tunnel vision refused to see the signs of the coming attack
by Hamas.
They thought Hamas
was interested in growing the Gaza economy and the intelligence services had
their attention centered on Iran, Hezbollah, and the West Bank. They refused to
believe reports coming from the Gaza watchers on the border and, in fact, they
did not have a single spy on the ground in Gaza. They relied too much on
technical superiority, rather than human intelligence.
Hamas, on the other
hand had excellent intelligence on what the Israeli’s were up to. They know
where the cameras and sensors were, and they knew down to the minute details
where troops were stationed and where the safe rooms of the nearby kibbutzim
were located.
Katz and Bohbot pull
no punches in describing the ideology of Hamas. Simply put, Hamas is a terrorist
organization dedicated to the destruction of Israel. They do not believe in the
so-called two state solution. They believe on one state that does not include
the Jews of Israel. Why gullible westerners support such barbarism will be the
topic of another blog.
The authors highlight
the huge military buildup that was taking place in Gaza. Starting with the
Morsi regime in Egypt which smuggled in weapons manufacturing and construction equipment
in 2012. That enabled Hamas to produce heavy weapon and to construct a labyrinth
of tunnels underneath Gaza. Israel has no idea as to the full extent of Hamas’ underground
city.
Indeed, Hamas war
using western and Arab aid to build a war machine. Further they invested some
of that aid into a host of front companies to generate income. One of those
companies was actually listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange.
Nevertheless, there
were warnings. In 2016 the defense minister urged a pre-emptive strike on Gaza.
That was turned down out fear of high casualties. Israel’s 2014 incursion into
Gaza did not go as well as planned with casualties far higher than expected.
Among the many recommendations
Katz and Bohbot recommend are:
· * Establish a Director
of National Intelligence to coordinate the various security agencies. I would
also create a Team B to critique the DNI conclusions.
· * Create a Department
of Informational Warfare. Hamas propaganda has been running rings around Israel.
· * Change the defense posture from deterrence to
active defense.
To conclude I believe
that this book should at least be a starting point for the coming investigation
of Israel’s intelligence failures. The witnesses are in the book. Netanyahu and
his cabinet will have a tough time in defending themselves from this
indictment.
