Showing posts with label NAFTA. Show all posts
Showing posts with label NAFTA. Show all posts

Saturday, January 13, 2018

My Amazon Review of Douglas A. Irwin's "Clashing over Commerce: A History of U.S. Trade Policy"

Trading Places

Dartmouth economist Douglas Irwin has written a very long (832 pages in the print edition) and sometime tedious history of U.S. trade policy, but in many respects it is a tour de force. In a way he is writing American history through the lens of trade. His history starts with the economic impact of the French and Indian War’s (The Seven Years War globally) on Britain’s fiscal and colonial policy. The Boston Tea Party was the result. After independence and the chaos caused by the failed Articles of Confederation one of whose attributes were tariffs among the states a new constitution was written that centralized trade policy within the national government. In fact the second law enacted by the first Congress was a tariff. It was needed to fund the government. Thus Trade policy is as old as the Republic.

Irwin divides his history into three eras: tariffs for revenue (1789-1860), tariffs for restriction (1861- 1933) and tariffs for reciprocity (1934-Present?). Initially export oriented (cotton and tobacco) South favored low tariffs (for revenue only) and the North supported tariffs to restrict imports as well. Given that geography Democrats were for low tariffs and Whigs/Republicans were for high tariffs. By the late 20th century the two parties traded places with Republicans favoring open trade while the Democrats became far more restrictionist. Irwin tells his story by going into the details of all of the major congressional debates on tariff questions. Sometimes this is very interesting and sometimes it gets a bit tedious, but it is history in the making.

The first real battle over trade took place in the 1820s where the political genius of Henry Clay pushed through a restrictive tariff which both protected northern industry and raised revenue to fund internal improvements. That was his American System. By 1832 led by John C. Calhoun the South rose up in protest against what he called the Tariff of Abominations and introduced the doctrine of nullification. Irwin notes that the fight over the tariff became a proxy war over slavery. Nevertheless, with the Southern Democrats largely in control tariffs were largely used for revenue only prior to the civil war.

With the Republicans coming to power in 1861 the tariff was first used to raise revenue to fund the civil war and afterwards to restrict the entry of foreign goods into the United States.  Irwin found no real evidence the high tariff policies of the Republicans promoted economic growth. This was due, in part, to the economy being wide open to immigration and technology transfers. It was also helpful that the U.S.’s leading trading partner was Britain which then had a zero tariff policy. It is unfortunate that Irwin did not note that the success of textile manufacturing in New England was due to stolen technology from Britain.

Although the Republicans were in the high tariff camp, both Presidents Garfield and McKinley in his second term were open to reciprocity. Unfortunately both were assassinated before they could implement their new ideas.

After growing unrest with the high tariff policies of the Republicans which were thought by the Democrats to promote monopoly and act as a tax on consumers, the new Wilson Administration moved swiftly to lower tariff. Irwin highlights how Wilson was very hands on in working with Congress to pass the Underwood Tariff which significantly lowered import duties. Something else was going on as well. The U.S. was becoming a major exporter of industrial goods. This was due to the discovery of huge iron deposits in the Mesabi Range of Minnesota which made the U.S. the world’s lowest cost producer of steel.

However after World War I and the Republicans returned to power tariffs were raised dramatically in 1923 with the Fordney-McCumber Tariff. That was followed by the Hawley-Smoot Tariff of 1930 which raised the already high tariffs by 15%. Irwin debunks the idea that the Hawley-Smoot Tariff caused the stock market crash and the depression. It did, however, exacerbate the global collapse of the early 1930s.

With the arrival of the Roosevelt Administration tariff policy takes a U-Turn. Secretary of State Cordell Hull established a policy of reciprocal trade, first with Latin America and then with the rest of the world. If anyone person is a hero in the book it is Cordell Hull. Under the leadership of state department official Will Clayton, the Truman Administration follows up deal by deal reciprocal trade agreements with broad multinational agreements(GATT now the WTO).

By the 1970s the parties traded places. The Republicans supporting trade in financial services and high technology products become free traders, while the labor oriented Democrats fearing the loss of union jobs become protectionists. Further the long free trade oriented South, switches sides as its textile manufacturing business come under stress. All of this came to a head with Democrat Bill Clinton supporting NAFTA against a majority of his party. NAFTA passed with Republican votes, but the fissures the battle engendered made Americans more suspicious of trade deals.

Those fears bore fruit with the leading Democratic candidates in 2016 opposing the Trans Pacific Partnership along with Donald Trump. Now with a protectionist in the White House and a protectionist Democratic Party it appears that the long era of reciprocal trade might be behind us. Irwin thinks there is too much momentum and it took the Civil War for policy to transition from revenue to restriction and it took the Great Depression to transition for restriction to reciprocity. My question is whether the Great Recession was another such trigger. I hope not.


In sum Irwin’s book is a long slog, but for those serious about how our trade policy came to be, it is well worth the effort.





Wednesday, December 27, 2017

Too Soon for the Democrats to Break Out the Champagne

All of the signs are now pointing to a Democratic wave election this coming November. Both the President Trump and the Republican Congress are in the doghouse in terms of poll numbers and 2018 is looking like a mirror image of the Republican sweep in 2010. For example in the 2009/10 period the Republicans took the governorships in New Jersey and Virginia and won a surprise victory in the special election for a Senate seat in Massachusetts. This year the Democrats won in Virginia and New Jersey and won a special election for a Senate seat in very red Alabama. Moreover the Democrats passed Obamacare with a straight party-line vote and this year the Republicans passed a massive tax cut on a straight party-line vote.

So what's wrong with this picture? Unlike 2010 when the economy was in the dumps the economy appears to be entering a boom phase. The unemployment rate in November 2018 will approximate a very low 3.5%. Moreover the expectations for the Trump tax cuts are so low that most voters will be pleasantly surprised when they see the tax cuts in their pay checks in February and the real pain on the limitation of state and local tax deductions won't show up until tax filing time in 2019. Thus the Republican poll numbers have nowhere to go but up.

Of course we shouldn't under-estimate the ability of the Republicans to screw up. For example Trump could blow up NAFTA triggering a stock market drop and increasing the likelihood of a recession in 2019. And over all of this looms the ongoing Mueller investigation of the 2016 election and likely a host of irregularities in the Trump Organization.

As a result the Democrats will make big gains in the House of Representatives, but whether it will be  enough to take control remains to be seen.





Friday, December 8, 2017

"Sunny 2018, Cloudy 2019," UCLA Anderson Forecast, December 2017

Sunny 2018, Cloudy 2019

David Shulman
Senior Economist
UCLA Anderson Forecast
December 2017

Of a sudden, propelled by strength (8% quarterly growth) in equipment spending, the economy is growing at a 3% clip and the near term outlook has become decidedly sunny. (See Figures 1 and 2) Moreover the 3% pace of growth is expected to continue through the second quarter of 2018. However as the unemployment rate drops below 4% and employment growth stalls in the face of a labor shortage, economic growth will drop back to the 2% growth rate we have been used to since the end of the financial crisis eight long years ago. Indeed by the end of the forecast horizon in 2019 real GDP growth could very well be running at a rate below 1.5% as the outlook becomes cloudy. (See Figures 3 and 4)


Figure 1. Real GDP Growth, 2007Q1 – 2019Q4F
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Figure 2. Real Equipment Spending, 2007Q1 – 2019Q4
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Figure 3. Nonfarm Employment, 2007Q1 -2019Q4
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and UCLA Anderson Forecast
Figure 4. Unemployment Rate, 2007Q1 -2019Q4
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Questions about Fiscal Policy

As we are writing in late November many questions remain about the major tax bills now working their way through Congress. There is uncertainty surrounding the corporate tax rate, state and local tax deductions, child credits and the permanence of the entire package. For modeling purposes we have assumed a ten year $1.5 trillion tax cut, with a 25% corporate tax rate (a compromise from 20%), some allowance for state and local tax deductions and $100 billion in revenues coming from a tax on repatriated corporate profits in 2018. This last point is one of the reasons why the federal deficit declines in 2018. (See Figure 5)

Figure 5. Federal Deficit, FY2007 – FY2019F

Sources: Office of Management and Budget and UCLA Anderson Forecast

We are more certain that the next few years will reverse the seven year annual decline in defense spending. (See Figure 6) With the potential for missiles from North Korea reaching the West Coast, continued fighting in the Middle-East and growing worries about Russia and China defense spending will likely be on the rise over the next several years. We are assuming real defense spending will increase by 2% and 2.7% in 2018 and 2019, respectively. If anything, our forecast is more likely to be low than high.

Figure 6. Real Defense Spending, FY2007 – FY2019F
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Monetary Policy in the Post-Yellen Era

With the appointment of Jerome Powell as Fed chairman the Janet Yellen era is coming to an end. Because Powell’s views on monetary policy are very similar to Yellen’s we do not anticipate any significant changes. However, with respect to regulatory policy, Powell is believed to be far more open than Yellen to reviewing the financial crisis regulations that were put into place from 2009 – 2012.

Thus we expect that the gradual interest rate normalization policy that has been underway for a year will continue well into 2019 with a 25 basis point increase from the current 1.375% rate in December and three more increases in 2018. By the end of 2019 the fed funds rate will likely approximate 3%. (See Figure 7) We caution that the futures markets, in contrast to our forecast and the Fed’s “dot plots”, are forecasting only one rate hike next year.

Concomitantly with the rise in short term interest rates long rates will rise as well and we would not be surprised to see the yield on 10-year U.S. Treasury bonds to exceed 4%, up from the current 2.4%. Rising inflation will be the driver in the increase in long rates, more on that below.

Figure 7. Federal Funds vs. 10 Year U.S. Treasury Bond Rates, 2007Q1 – 2019Q4F
Sources: Federal Reserve Board and UCLA Anderson Forecast

The Powell Fed will also continue the policy of gradually shrinking the Fed’s bloated balance sheet that began in October. (See Figure 8) Simply put after three phases of quantitative easing that expanded the balance sheet from $800 billion to over four trillion dollars will be unwound over a period of several years with the ultimate target of $2.5 - $3.0 trillion, quantitative tightening if you will.  (See Figure 8) But make no mistake the balance sheet shrink the Fed is attempting to do is unprecedented.


Figure 8. Federal Reserve Assets, 2003 –Nov 15, 2017, In $ Millions, SA



Source: Federal Reserve Board via Fred

Inflation on the Rise

It now appears that the second quarter slowdown in inflation was transitory and the future quarterly track in inflation will be in excess of 2% throughout the forecast horizon. (See Figure 9) This will hold true for both “headline” and “core” consumer prices. Further oil prices now appear to be tracking about $10/barrel higher than our forecast of just one quarter ago.

Figure 9. Headline vs. Core Inflation, 2007Q1- 2019Q4F
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and UCLA Anderson Forecast

The primary source of the rising rate of inflation will be a significant rebound in wage growth. After creeping along in the 2% range, we forecast acceleration in total compensation growth to approximately 4% by late 2018 on a year-over-year basis. (See Figure 10) The recent rise in labor productivity buttresses our view that the long anticipated increase in wages is at hand.

Figure 10. Total Compensation per Hour, 2007Q1 – 2019Q4
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Consumer Spending Supported by Rising Wages and Asset Prices

Real consumption spending is rebounding from the 1.5% increase in 2016 to 2.7% and 2.8% in 2017 and 2018, respectively. (See Figure 11) However, as auto sales slow in 2019 consumption growth will slip back to 2.2%. (See Figure 12) Simply put it is getting very late in the auto cycle. However as long as stock and house prices remain elevated the consumer, or at least the high end consumer, will remain in good shape. (See Figures 13 and 14) In the case of the lower end consumer we are encouraged by Wal*Mart reporting a strong 2.7% increase in year-over-year same store sales in their latest quarter.

Figure 11. Real Consumption Expenditures, 2007 – 2019F
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Figure 12. Light Vehicle Unit Sales, 2007 – 2019F
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis and UCLA Anderson Forecast




Figure 13. S&P/Case-Shiller 20-City Composite Home Price Index, Dec 1999 – Aug 2017, December 1999 =100, SA


Sources: Standard & Poor’s via FRED

Figure 14. S&P 500 Stock Index, 18 Nov 2007 – 17 Nov 17


Sources: Standard & Poor’s via BigCharts.com

One of the big puzzles in recent years is the lack of robustness in new single family housing construction. Given low interest rates and strong employment growth housing activity should be doing much better. Two factors that are being discussed more and more are the unwillingness of the baby boom generation to move as they age in place and highly restrictive zoning in the booming coastal cities. As a result housing starts have remained below the underlying demographic demand of 1.4 – 1.5 million units a year for a decade. We are forecasting modest increases in housing starts from an estimated 1.19 million units this year to 1.27 million and 1.34 million in 2018 and 2019, respectively. (See Figure 15)



Figure 15. Housing Starts 2007Q1 -2019Q4F
Sources: Bureau of the Census and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Exports Rebounding, But NAFTA Risk Looms

In response to a recovering global economy real exports are recovering from the near zero growth of 2015 and 2016. Real exports are estimated to increase by 3.2% this year and 4.5% and 4.1% in 2018 and 2019, respectively. (See Figure 16) According to a recent Goldman Sachs report world economic growth is forecast to increase 3.7% this year and 4.1% in 2018.[i] Growth will come from, 2+% growth in the Euro Area, 6.5% in China, a very strong 8% in India and a rebound in Brazil from O.9% in 2017 to 2.7% in 2018.  (See Figure 17)


Figure 16. Real Export Growth, 2007 – 2019F
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Figure 17. Global Real GDP Growth, 2016 – 2019F, Annual Data

Country/Region
2016A
2017F
2018F
2019F
Japan
1.0
1.6
1.6
1.3
Euro Area
1.7
2.3
2.2
1.8
UK
1.8
1.5
1.3
1.6
China
6.7
6.8
6.5
6.1
India
7.1
6.4
8.0
8.3
Brazil
-3.6
0.9
2.7
3.1
World (incl. U.S.)
3.2
3.7
4.0
3.9

Source: Goldman Sachs

The real risk to our export forecast and for that matter the entire forecast is political. In less than a year President Trump has blown up the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade treaty and the global climate accord. The North American Free Trade Treaty (NAFTA) could be next especially given the hawkish views espoused by Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross and Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer. Although news from the Mexico City negotiations is not on the front burner, it would be advisable to pay very close attention. Why? Leaving NAFTA is not so simple because it would undo countless supply chains among the three countries (U.S., Canada and Mexico) involved. Just as a reminder the gross trade volumes among the three NAFTA partners amounts to over one trillion dollars per year.[ii] Especially hard hit would be the U.S. automobile industry where parts cross borders several times in the manufacturing of a single automobile. In our view should the U.S. leave NAFTA the growth outlook would deteriorate and the chance of a recession in late 2018 or 2019 would significantly increase.

Conclusion

With our weather forecast analogy for a title we are hoping to be as accurate as modern weather forecasting. Economics has a lot to learn from near term weather forecasting. It looks like 2018 is shaping up to be a pretty good year. There is momentum coming from the recent strength in 2017, strong equipment spending, the likelihood of a tax cut and a consumer that is benefiting from higher asset prices and the prospect of higher wages. Unemployment will drop below 4% and remain there throughout most of the forecast horizon and inflation will experience an uptick. The Fed will respond by continuing to normalize short term interest rates with the Fed Funds rate on a path to 3% by 2019. However as we get into 2019 inflation could be approaching 3% and the economy will slow as it reaches capacity constraints.

The risks to the forecast include the unknowable consequences of the Fed reducing its balance sheet and the potential failure of the ongoing NAFTA negotiations. All told a sunny 2018 with clouds coming in 2019.



[i] See Hatzius, Jan et.al., “As Good as it Gets,” Goldman Sachs, November 15, 2017
[ii] See Shulman, David, “Extreme Makeover: Second Pass at Trumponomics,” UCLA Anderson Forecast, March 2017

Friday, March 10, 2017

"Extreme Makeover: Second Pass at Trumponomics," UCLA Anderson Forecast, March 2017

Despite all of the chaos coming out of the early days of the new Trump Administration stocks continued to rally on the prospects for “pro-growth” tax cuts, regulatory reform and infrastructure spending. (See Figure 1) However, the rally in bond yields and the dollar stalled as those markets began to exhibit a higher degree of skepticism about President Trump’s still vague proposals and the ability of the Congress to expeditiously pass them. (See Figures 2 and 3) As a result we have pushed back the effective date of the tax cuts to the first quarter of 2018 compared to the third quarter of 2017 that we previously forecast.[i]

Figure 1. S&P 500, Feb. 25, 2016 – Feb. 24, 2017, Daily Data



Source: Standard and Poor’s via Bigcharts.com


Figure 2. 10-Year U.S. Treasury Bond Yield, Feb. 25 2016 – Feb. 24, 2017, Daily Data
Source: Bigcharts.com

Figure 3. Dollar Index, Feb 25, 2016 – Feb. 24, 2017, Daily Data


Source: Bigcharts.com

Similar to last quarter we are still penciling in about $500 billion/year in personal and business tax reductions, a repatriation holiday for accumulated foreign earnings, increased defense and infrastructure spending, Medicaid cuts, relaxed regulations, modest changes to trade and immigration policies, and reductions in food and aircraft exports as several trading partners react to the policy changes. It remains to be seen to what extent the Affordable Care Act will be amended and its impact on the giant healthcare sector. Further because of the controversy that it has engendered we do not believe that Congress will pass a border adjustment import tax combined with exempting export sales from corporate taxation.

We have, however, become more concerned about the administration’s tone with respect to trade and immigration policies. The changes could be far more drastic than what we are now anticipating thereby increasing the risk level to our forecast. The roll-out of the administration’s partial travel ban and the scandal surrounding the firing of the national security advisor certainly were not a confidence building measures.

Trillion Dollar Annual Deficits Ahead

The impact of a large tax cut on an economy at or very close to full employment will be to explode the federal deficit. We expect the federal deficit to exceed a trillion dollars in 2019 which would amount to about 5% of GDP. (See Figure 4) Simply put there is not enough slack in the economy to enable the 4% economic growth the administration is calling for and it will likely lead to more inflation.


Figure 4. Federal Deficit, FY 2007 – FY2019F
Sources: Office of Management and Budget and UCLA Anderson Forecast

The Fed will become More Aggressive

As of April there will be three vacancies on the seven member Federal Reserve Board which will likely be filled by more hawkish and less economics oriented members.  The era of the very easy Bernanke-Yellen Fed is over and that will be confirmed when Chair Yellen’s term expires in January 2018. Moreover with inflation rising we expect that even under Chair Yellen the Fed will become more active in raising the Fed Funds rate and we believe that the Federal Open Market Committee will increase the fed funds rate by 25 basis points in March. By yearend the funds rate is expected to approach 2% and reach 3% by the end of 2018. (See Figure 5) Similarly the yield on 10-year U.S. Treasury bonds is forecast to increase to 3% by year end and exceed 4% by yearend 2018.




Figure 5. Federal Funds vs. 10-Year U.S. Treasury Bonds, 2007Q1 – 2019Q4F
Sources: Federal Reserve Board and UCLA Anderson Forecast

2018 GDP Growth Spike that Fades

With $500 billion in tax cuts arriving in the first quarter of 2018 we expect a short term growth spike that will soon fade as the economy bumps against its full employment ceiling. Our forecast calls for real GDP growth of 2.4%, 3.0% and 2.2% annual growth in 2017, 2018 and 2019, respectively. (See Figure 6) And note that real growth really trails off on a quarterly basis in 2019 as higher interest rates weigh on the economy. As we noted last quarter, in order for growth to be sustained at 3%, the economy requires a “productivity miracle.” The administration believes that its tax and regulatory reforms will enable a sustainable growth pick up. We, on the other hand, remain skeptical, but, of course, we can’t rule it out.

See Figure 6. Real GDP Growth, 2007Q1 – 2019Q4F
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce and UCLA Anderson Forecast
In this environment, the labor market will remain robust with job growth coming in on the order of 170,000 a month in 2017 and 2018, before trailing off to about 110,000 a month in 2019. The recent increase in the labor force participation rate has made us more optimistic about job growth over the near term. (See Figure 7) In tandem with the job gains the unemployment rate now looks like it will bottom out at 4.1% in late 2018, before gradually rising. (See Figure 8) Of course if the administration embarks on a large scale deportation program for unauthorized immigrants employment growth will be far slower than what we are now forecasting. Moreover should the administration restrict the issuance of H1-B visas for highly skilled immigrants there would be negative consequences for high technology industries.

Figure 7. Payroll Employment, 2007Q1 -2019Q4
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Figure 8. Unemployment Rate, 2007Q1 – 2019Q4F
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics and UCLA Anderson Forecast
Inflation on the Rise

Both headline and core inflation rates as measured by the consumer price index are already increasing at a 2%+ clip. It will not take much for inflation to ramp up to between 2.5% - 3%. (See Figure 9) Oil prices continue to rebound and the very tight labor market will bring with it rising wages. (See Figure 10) Although we were too early in our prior forecasts in predicting accelerating wage inflation, we now believe that the table has been set for sustained 4% annual increases in compensation. (See Figure 11) We believe that the unusually slow 0.1% increase in average hourly earnings reported for January was a fluke and it was inconsistent with other labor market data.

Figure 9. Consumer Price Index, Headline vs. Core, 2007Q1 – 2019Q4
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Figure 10.Compensation/Hour, 2007Q1 – 2019Q4
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and UCLA Anderson Forecast
 Consumer Strong, but Housing Stalls

The growth in consumer spending has been strong since 2014 and automobile sales have been running at a record rate. (See Figure 11) Now throw in a large tax cut and real consumer spending will ramp up from a forecast 2.8% increase this year to 3.6% in 2018. In this tax cut fueled environment the saving rate will exceed 7%. (See Figure 12)However, housing starts will plateau out in the 1.2 – 1.3 million unit range. (See Figure 13) Simply put the rise in interest rates will offset the positive factors of higher employment and wages. By 2019 the rate on the 30 year fixed rate mortgage is forecast to exceed 6%, up from the current 4.25% and the recent low of 3.5%. Moreover, because there are numerous signs that high income multi-family housing is becoming over-supplied, that once white hot sector of the economy will soon cool.

Figure 11. Real Consumption Spending, 2007 -2019F



Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce and UCLA Anderson Forecast



Figure 12. Saving Rate, 2007 -2019F
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Figure 13. Housing Starts, 2007Q1 -2019Q4F
Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Capital Spending Rebounds in the Face of Export Weakness

With the prospect of a general reduction in corporate income taxes and the likelihood of 100% expensing, equipment spending is forecast to rebound from 2.8% decline in 2016 to increases of 3.5% and 7.1% in 2017 and 2018, respectively. Equipment spending will also be buoyed by the recovery in oil and gas drilling being spurred on by the rebound in oil prices.

Figure 14. Real Equipment Spending, 2007 -2019
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce and UCLA Anderson Forecast

On the other hand, despite all of the rhetoric coming out of the administration the strong dollar and the large tax cuts will ignite an import boom. After increasing by only 1.1% in 2016, imports will increase by 4.3% and 7.3% in 2017 and 2018, respectively. (See Figure 15) On the other hand export growth will be minimal as the high dollar and retaliation from the administration’s protectionist views by some of our trading partners will limit export growth especially in the aircraft and agricultural sectors. (See Figure 16)

Figure 15. Real Imports, 2007 -2019F
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce and UCLA Anderson forecast
Figure 16. Real Exports, 2007 -2019F
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Moreover the administration’s outspoken hostility to NAFTA, especially with respect to Mexico risks a major disruption in economic activity. In 2015 the U.S. exported $236 billion to Mexico while importing $309 billion. Aside from disrupting supply chains, a significant reduction in U.S.-Mexico trade would have significant macroeconomic effects. (See Figure 17)

Figure 17. Schematic of NAFTA Trade
Source: Geopolitical Futures


Defense Spending on a Roll

As we have been discussing for several years the geopolitical threats coming from Russia, China, Iran and ISIS will force the U.S. to increase defense spending. After six years of real declines, defense purchases are forecast to increase by 1.2% in 2017 and then increase by 4.1% and 2.5% in 2018 and 2019, respectively. (See Figure 18) As we noted last quarter, this is one spending priority that is expected to receive broad support, especially with the increased hostility toward Russia coming from the Democratic Party. Further with the administration pressing NATO members to increase defense spending to 2% of GDP, domestic defense outlays will be augmented by increased international demand.

Figure 18. Real Defense Purchases, 2007 -2019F
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Conclusion

We continue to believe that the election of Donald Trump represents a major regime change with respect to economic policy. We expect significant reductions in personal and corporate income taxes along with a relaxing of regulation in the energy, environmental and financial arenas. However, because the economy is already operating at or close to full employment, the growth spurt caused by the policy changes will be short-lived but the deficits that it will create will be with us for a long time. Moreover the policy changes will elevate both inflation and interest rates that will have a negative effect on the housing sector.

Because of the Trump administration’s rocky start, we have become more concerned about the risks associated with their stated trade and immigration policies. For the time being we have not modeled in serious trade disturbances with our major trading partners and a reduction in the labor force caused by a significant change in deportation policies. Nevertheless those risks are rising.



[i]  See Shulman, David, “First Pass at Trumponomics: From a Reckless Monetary to a Reckless Fiscal Policy,” UCLA Anderson Forecast, December 2016.