My Review of Adrian Woodridge's "The Revolutionary Center"

Liberalism Under Siege

Adrian Wooldridge, formerly political editor of The Economist and now an opinion columnist at Bloomberg, has offered up a history of liberal political thought from Montesquieu to John Stuart Mill and on to Hayek, Keynes, and Friedman. That liberalism faces attacks to today from the authoritarian Right and the identitarian Left reminiscent of the 1930’s. (See: https://shulmaven.blogspot.com/2023/11/reliving-1930s-part-5.html ) And it goes without saying that the concept of free speech is now under a withering assault. Wooldridge wants to reclaim liberalism’s revolutionary history that brought freedom and prosperity to much of the world. Thus, you can call him a revolutionary centrist, and the world truly needs hm today.

 

For whatever reason, too many people have abandoned the basic tenets of liberalism which include freedom of thought, a free market, room for heterodox views and the removal of obstacles to self-development. In short, Wooldridge believes in a meritocracy that offers a ladder up for those folks who have been left behind.

 

In terms of government liberalism stands for the separation of powers as articulated by the U.S. Constitution. He quotes Lord Acton about power corrupting, and we are getting a real-life lesson with the antics of Donald Trump.

 

Wooldridge sees three strands of liberalism today. The first being neoliberalism with its faith in markets to solve society’s problems. Second, managerial liberalism, which is characterized by an elite consensus coming out of Davos, the universities, and the NGOs. The third form is progressive liberalism which exalts rights over responsibilities especially for groups. I would not call this liberalism.

 

Wooldridge offers political solutions reanimating liberalism. He moves to the right and the left at the same time by calling for higher taxes, antitrust enforcement of the tech companies, immigration restrictions, and a return to merit-based admissions to the universities. He also doesn’t believe that Muslim fundamentalism is compatible with liberalism. If the Muslim population of Europe can’t be integrated into the broader society Europe will (is) be in a world of hurt.

 

To me the solution is in governing, not only in making political compromises as necessary as they are. In order for liberalism to succeed, it has to govern successfully. That means a wholesale repudiation of the “blue model” that now governs most of America’s large cities. The high tax-low service model of the blue cities and today’s U.K. for example, is forcing voters to move towards the authoritarian right and to the socialist left in the U.S.

 

We are living in a time where the horseshoe theory of politics holds as both the right, and the left ending up in opposition to the liberal order that has served us well for of these years. It is a real shame, and it is very disheartening. Wooldridge points us a way out of this malaise.

My Review of George Selgin's "False Dawn: The New Deal and the Promise of Recovery, 1933-1947"

The Recovery that Failed

Libertarian economist George Selgin has written an intriguing history of the New Deal and role Keynesian thought played in it. The book is largely a critique of Eric Rauchway’s “The Moneymakers.” (See:   https://shulmaven.blogspot.com/2015/12/my-amazon-review-of-eric-rauchways.html ) In the main I agree with Selgin. Simply put, many policies attributed to Roosevelt weren’t really his and by and large Roosevelt was wary of deficits as a macroeconomic policy tool. In Selgin’s framework the New Deal consisted of three R’s: recovery, relief, and reform. Selgin focuses on the recovery aspects and notes that Roosevelt’s deficits came from funding relief.

To begin with the ideas behind the Emergency Banking Act of 1933 which closed and then reopened the banks came from Hoover’s treasury department, namely Secretary Ogden Reed and Under-Secretary Arthur Ballentine. Further Roosevelt opposed the deposit insurance provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act because of the moral hazards associated with it. That issue would come to the fore in the 1980’s. A criticism of Selgin is that he does not give credit for how successful deposit insurance was during the 1937-38 downturn. The bank runs of the early depression were over.

 

As to deficit financing, the biggest deficit took place in 1936 when the World War I veterans’ bonus was paid out. Roosevelt opposed it and his veto was over-ridden. The payout provided a short-term boost to the economy and played a significant role in his re-election. However, in 1937 the lack of such stimulus played a role in that year’s downturn.

 

In the Spring of 1938 Roosevelt and his advisors finally took Keynes’ advice and embarked on the first true Keynesian stimulus of his administration. However, in the light of the World War II spending that was to come, it was far too little.

 

Selgin credits the massive gold inflows of the 1930’s for the modest recovery that took place. The gold came from Stalin’s stepping up gold production in the Soviet Union and European flight capital fearing Hitler. It was the gold inflow that enabled the Fed to embark on a policy of monetary easing, a policy that was halted in late 1936 as the treasury sterilized the gold inflows out of fear of inflation.

Roosevelt did take the U.S. off the gold standard in 1933 and raised the price of gold, a stratagem that Keynes advised. To Keynes it would be path to monetary ease. However, according to Selgin the increase in price of gold came from the ideas of George Warren who thought that a rise in the price of gold would automatically increase commodity prices. It did not.

 

Along the way Selgin notes how Roosevelt’s reforms stalled the economy, and the anti-business nature of his policies greatly weakened private investment. That would not turn until World War II ended and the feared depression did not take hold. Selgin observed a rise in business optimism in the aftermath of the war; however, this sentiment was not reflected in stock prices, as Wall Street experienced a three-year bear market from 1946 to 1949.  Stock market investors at the time were clearly worried. As a result, it would have helped to have some discussion of stock prices during his 1933-1947 history.

 

 

 

The Recession of 2025

This coming December the Business Cycle Dating Committee of the National Bureau of Economic Research will find that a recession began in the second quarter. Although there are clear signs that the economy is weakening, most observers believe that we are in a temporary growth slowdown. Moreover, you can’t see a recession in the most recent economic data. Therein lies the point I am trying to make. When a recession is in the data, it is too late to make a credible forecast, because the whole world would already know it. The task of a forecaster is to make a call when the data is ambiguous, not when it is clear. Of course, I along with many who called for a recession 2022 and 2023 were dead wrong.* Obviously, the forecasting community is gun shy.

My argument for a recession is based on the recent 10% decline in stock prices that will dampen consumer spending, the friction caused by the Trump tariffs that will raise prices, stall capital spending, and disrupt supply chains and government spending will decline making it pro-cyclical. It looks like we are about to relearn the very hard lessons of the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act.  

At the start of the year the value of an expensive U.S. stock market was more that two times nominal GDP. As Keynes noted, “Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on a steady stream of enterprise. But the position is serious when enterprise becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of speculation. When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done.”

Moreover, I would suggest that the stock market decline is far from over. On March 5th I posted on LinkedIn that the high for the stock market was in. Steve Blitz of Lombard came back to me with the comment, “More critical is where is the low.” My sense is that the stock market and the recession will feed off each other that will send the S&P 500 down to the 4900-5000 level, making for a bear market-like 20% decline. We closed to today at 5600. 

Although it is hard to prove statistically my guess is that with 50% of consumption accounted for by the top 10% of income earners, the decline in stock prices will have a negative effect on consumer spending via the wealth effect. Consumption spending as a share labor income is very stable, not so for wealth.  Early signs of weakening consumption was highlighted by several airline executives mentioning a slowdown in air travel.

As far as supply chains go just think about the amount of steel and aluminum, now subject to a 25% tariff, which is used by the Ford F-150 truck and the Boeing 737 airplane. There may be domestic substitutes for steel, but not aluminum. The electric grid is troubled enough that it would be hard pressed to supply electricity to a new aluminum smelter.

Net Net. President Trump’s speculation that the transition to his “golden age” could be marked by a recession.

* I operate under the slogan "Often wrong, never in doubt."

 

My Review of Andrew Leigh's ""How Economics Explains the World: A Short History......"

History Through the Lens of Economics

Andrew Leigh over-promises and under-delivers in his history of the world through the lens of economics. To be sure economics is particularly important but as Ecclesiastes says, ‘time and chance happens to all.” Economics gives us tools to help understand the world, such as incentives, diminishing marginal utility and sometimes, as behavioral economics has taught us, people aren’t as rational as the classical theory would predict.

He, of course, mentions many of the great economists from Smith to Keynes and Freidman, and Kahneman. There works clearly help explain the world. He also mentions the work of Jared Diamond on the importance of an economy residing along and east-west axis as opposed to a north-south axis. This helps to explain why the northern hemisphere has done so much better than the southern hemisphere, but what does that have to do with economics?

He fails to discuss how human beings can really screw up what apparently looks like a strong endowment. Witness the weakness of Russia and Argentina and the converse of South Korea and Japan.

My bottom line is if you want a very short overview of the role of economics in history, this book might be for you, but it leaves out much.

My Amazon Review of Volker Ullrich's "Germany 1923: Hyper Inflation, Hitler's Putsch and...."

 Weimar’s Trial by Fire

I previously reviewed Volker Ullrich’s two volume biography of Adolf Hitler. ( See: Shulmaven: My Amazon Review of Volker Ullrich's "Hitler: Ascent, 1889-1939" and Shulmaven: My Amazon Review of Volker Ullrich's "Hitler: Downfall, 1939-1945 )                                      Here the distinguished German historian focuses in on the critical year of 1923 which almost brought with it the premature death of the then five-year year-old Weimar Republic. His hero is the grand coalition prime minister, Gustav Stresemann, who manages to hold it together long enough so that the nascent republic survives its first trial by fire. It won’t be so lucky the next time.

 

What Stresemann faces is a hyper inflation that brings the Mark’s valuation down to 4.2 trillion to the dollar, the French occupation of the Ruhr for nonpayment of reparations, the Hitler Putsch in Munich, and a communist rising ordered by the Comintern in Moscow in Saxony, Thuringia, and Hamburg.  If this weren’t enough a separatist movement arose in the Rhine Valley where one of the leading figures was Cologne mayor Konrad Adenauer. As Keynes noted in his “Economic Consequences of the Peace,”  

       “There is no subtler, no surer means of overturning the existing basis of society than to debauch the currency. The process engages all the hidden forces of economic law on the side of destruction and does it in a manner which not one man in a million is able to diagnose.”

 

Indeed, it was this inflation that destroyed the relationship between debtors and creditors, wiped out middle-class savings and immiserated huge swaths of the hitherto prosperous middle-class. Although not fatal at the time, when hard times returned to Germany in 1930, it happened with a vengeance.

 

Yet through it all, with all of its inherent faults, parliamentary democracy survived in Germany. By the end of the year the introduction of the Rentenmark, stabilized the currency which created the precondition for a substantial economic recovery in the late 1920’s. Working very effectively behind the scenes was U.S. Ambassador Alanson Houghton who worked tirelessly with Stresemann to get German acceptance of what was to become the Dawes Plan that enabled American loans to Germany. Later when American credit dried up, the roof fell in.

 

All the while Germany was in political and economic crisis the arts were flourishing. Germany became the second largest producer of motion pictures with such luminaries as Emil Jennings, Fritz Lang, and Conrad Veidt. Veidt would go on to play Major Heinrich Strasser in “Casablanca.” There was also the artist George Grosz, the playwright Bertolt Brecht and the founder of the Bauhaus, Walter Gropius.

 

Underneath it was a far right that never accepted democracy, industrialists who sought to undo the labor reforms of 1918, a judicial system that punished the Left far mor more severely than the Right.  Through it all Stresemann, originally a man of the Right, ended up being one of Weimar’s biggest supporters and by 1925, as foreign minister, he negotiated the Locarno Treaty with France confirming Germany’s western borders.

 

After reading this book I became more optimistic about the future of America. If the fledgling Weimar democracy could survive the challenges discussed above, certainly the 250-year-old democracy of the United States can survive our current dyspepsia. Germany faced far worse and came through it.

For the full Amazon URL see: Weimar's Trial by Fire (amazon.com)

My Amazon Review of J. Bradford DeLong's "Slouching Toward Utopia: An Economic History of the Twentieth Century"

The Long Twentieth Century 

U.C. Berkeley economics professor and former Clinton treasury official Brad DeLong has written a narrative economic history of the long twentieth century which he argues began in 1870 and ended in 2010 with the great financial crisis. It was during this time that economic growth exploded and humanity, for the most part, escaped the Malthusian trap. Along with rising living standards the long twentieth century brought with it industrial strength destruction and environmental degradation. He attributes this to the rise of the giant corporation, the industrial research laboratory and globalization. However this book differs from Robert Gordon’s “The Rise and Fall of American Growth” (Shulmaven: My Amazon Review of Robert J. Gordon's "The Rise and Fall of American Growth") in that DeLong covers far more than technological developments.

 

DeLong frames his argument over the differences between the views of Friedrich von Hayek and Karl Polanyi. DeLong characterizes Hayek as believing “the market giveth and the market taketh away, blessed be the name of the market” and Polanyi’s view that the market is made for man, not the other way around. A long time ago I had an economics professor who would open each class by invoking the blessing of the market and he was a liberal Democrat.  DeLong’s utopia represents a merger between Hayek and Polanyi that ends up with a social democratic version of Keynesian economics.  What he is vague about is that when he discusses the notion of Polanyian rights, which amount to the belief that citizens are entitled to a host of economic benefits, earned and unearned with no real limiting factors. DeLong is a fan the European entitlement state, but he fails to mention that most of the entitlements are funded by regressive payroll and value added taxes that would be a very rough sale in America.

 

Where the book is good, he has excellent vignettes on the lives of real people who were making history such as Nikola Tesla and Leon Trotsky. He also goes into the horrors of “really existing socialism” in both its Russian and Chinese forms. In that sense DeLong is a true social democrat. He is also very good in discussing how the 1970’s inflation undid the Keynesian consensus and led to the neo-liberal order which then collapses as deregulated financial markets were consumed by a fire of their own making.

 

What DeLong leaves out is that much scientific progress came outside of the organized industrial laboratories. He gives no credit to governmental and university labs, and he leaves out the garage work of Bill Hewlett and David Packard, Bill Gates, and Steve Jobs. These folks were tinkerers in the tradition of the early Thomas Edison. Further for some reason he leaves out of his discussion the role of the oil industry whose products fueled the mobility of his long twentieth century. Without the oil industry little of what he discussed would have occurred.

 

DeLong has written an excellent narrative history of our era; just take his politics with a few grains of salt.

For the full Amazon URL see: The Long Twentieth Century (amazon.com)

My Amazon Review of Nicholas Wapshott's "Samuelson Friedman: The Battle Over the Free Market"

 

The Clash

 

The theme of Nicholas Wapshott’s book is the clash of ideas between superstar economists Milton Friedman and Paul Samuelson over the role of government in the economy as played out in series of columns in Newsweek magazine starting in 1966 and lasting through the early 1980’s. Although Wapshott quotes from many of the columns, nowhere is there to be found are the full-length columns of the two protagonists. Because I was an avid reader of those columns when they came out, I was looking forward to rereading at least a few of them. I view this a significant failure of the book.

 

You can view this book as a follow-om to Wapshott’s “Keynes Hayek” book of a few years ago where the role of government was debated in the context of the deflationary 1930’s compared the inflationary 1960’s and 70’s. As an aside, it is not as good as his earlier work. Wapshott makes it out as duel, but in fact both Friedman and Samuelson were friends since their college days in the early 1930’s who were very respectful of each other. Wapshott makes Friedman out as an outsider arriviste, when in fact he was president of the American Economic Association in 1968 where his presidential address set the stage for the great debate about economic policy.

As America’s leading Keynesian Samuelson’s neoclassical synthesis was under attack as his paradigm could not explain the stagflation that was occurring in the U.S. and Western Europe. Simply put inflation was existing side by side with high unemployment. Friedman’s answer was monetarism which took the profession by storm in the 1970’s because it accurately explained the inflationary processes that were underway. However, by the early 1980’s it ceased to work and when crises came in 2008 and 2020, it was Samuelson’s Keynesian playbook that was trotted out to save the day.

 

Wapshott rightly characterized Friedman as a politician seeking to get his libertarian views implemented, while Samuelson was far less motivated by politics. Naturally Freidman as a politician rubbed many of Samuelson’s colleagues the wrong way and took his attacks on their views all too personally.  Along the way Wapshott offers up pretty good biographies of both Freidman and Samuelson. The book is a good read for econ geeks, of which I am one.

For the full Amazon URL see: The Clash (amazon.com) 

My Amazon Review of Matthew Klein's and Michael Pettis' "Trade Wars are Class Wars: How Rising Inequality Distorts the Global Economy and Threatens International Peace"

Global Keynesians

Barron’s economics columnist Matthew Klein and  Peking University economics professor Michael Pettis have written a widely discussed book bemoaning the global savings glut that they believe to be the cause of the increase in trade tensions over the past two decades. And it is the high rate of savings by the wealthy that reduces aggregate demand globally thereby suppressing output and wages. It is Keynes’ classic under-consumption view of the world. Klein and Pettis try to prove their point by examining the economies of China, Germany and the United States.

But before that they go through a serious history of trade policy and economic crises from the 1820’s on. Unfortunately they make a few mistakes along the way. They admire Henry Clay’s American System of tariffs, internal improvements and national bank. However they ignore the secret sauce of American protectionism in 1800s, that being a tidal wave of immigration. Instead of importing products, America imported labor, much of it skilled. When immigration was cut-off in the 1920s and record high tariffs were imposed, the economy collapsed into the Great Depression. Along the way the authors surprisingly have some nice things to say about the gold standard.

Klein and Pettis early on cite Keynes’ discussion of how well the French economy fared with the payment of an indemnity arising out of their defeat in the Franco-Prussian War. What they leave out is that the excess savings generated by the French economy in the 1850’s and 1860’s was the source of funds. Hence what the Asian nations and Russia learned after the 1997-98 crisis, was the need for central banks to establish precautionary balances. It is those balances that make nation resilient to the vagaries and vicissitudes of the international economy. And as Klein and Pettis rightly note, the Asian and Russian response to the crisis greatly contributed to the savings glut.

The overarching thesis of the book is that capital flows drive trade flows. Simply put a trade deficit in the U.S. requires a capital inflow and a trade surplus in China requires a capital outflow. The authors use accounting identities to make their point. However accounting identities do not define causation because other items are not held constant. For example an increase in government spending, other things being equal increases GDP, but other things do not remain equal as consumption or investment or exports could be simultaneously reduced.

The authors make a very straight forward case that China should reduce its exports, which line the pockets of the Communist Party Bigs and the industrial elite at the expense of the workers. In turn the economy should shift towards domestic consumption through a policy of higher wages and a stronger social safety net. That all makes sense, but the high wage-stronger social safety net policy is inimical for the trade deficit-prone United States. All that would do is increase the U.S’s trade deficit.

Klein and Pettis also offer up other polices one of which is akin to modern monetary theory. Simply put, if the world is short of safe assets, the U.S. should sell all the bonds the rest of the world is demanding. They leave unsaid the impact of that policy on the foreign exchange value of the dollar. They also believe that the Dollar Standard that the global economy is now is instead of it being an exorbitant privilege, it is now an exorbitant burden. They would substitute Keynes’ Bancor, an idea that failed at the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference, but it is certainly worthy of discussion today.

There was one line in the book that really intrigued me. The authors note that the three areas of intense government involvement; housing, healthcare and higher education are the primary drivers of U.S. inflation. I would suggest that it would be in keeping with their concern about the immiseration of the U.S. working class to focus their next book on this topic.

To sum up, the Klein-Pettis book is being taken very seriously in policy circles and it could very well have a real influence on a potential Biden Administration. It is worth a critical read.

For the full Amazon URL see: https://www.amazon.com/gp/customer-reviews/R4B7PKBQT8DPR/ref=cm_cr_arp_d_rvw_ttl?ie=UTF8&ASIN=B087TJKJRQ

My Amazon Review of Zachary Carter's "The Price of Peace: Money, Democracy and the Life of John Maynard Keynes"

The Economist as Savior

Zachary Carter has given us a well-written and very hagiographic biography the great economist John Maynard Keynes. Carter gives much credit to Robert Skidelsky’s three volume biography of Keynes and the first two-thirds of  this book makes it far easier for the lay reader to get an understanding of Keynes the economist and Keynes the man. The last third of the book is devoted to how macroeconomics evolved after Keynes.  And it is the last third that I have much to quarrel with it.

Keynes was a very interesting guy. A leader in the avant-garde Bloomsbury group, gay until his late 30s and then he falls in love with the Russian ballerina Lydia Lopokava with whom he happily marries. But what Carter and the lay reader is really interested in is, Keynes the economist.

Keynes becomes a leading public intellectual when he wrote the “Economic Consequences of the Peace” in 1920 criticizing the Post World War I Versailles Treaty, a book that I have read many times over. He then writes very seriously about monetary theory in the 1920s which culminates in his magnum opus, modestly titled “The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money”. That too is a book that I have read many times. With that book Keynes invents macroeconomics.

But Carter is not only interested in macroeconomics he is interested in Keynes’ social theories concerning the good life and the equitable distribution of income. Carter is less interested in economic stabilization then in promoting Keynes’ view of what a good society should be. It he where he goes astray. He spends precious few pages on the role of John Hicks in distilling the General Theory down the IS-LM curves of undergraduate economic textbooks. It is the IS-LM structure that establishes Keynesian economics, first in Britain and the in the U.S.  Without Hicks what we know of Keynesian economics would be limited.

Carter discusses how Keynesian economics became embedded in the Eisenhower and especially the Kennedy-Johnson administrations. It was there, aided and abetted by the Philips Curve, the economists over-promised and under-delivered laying the basis for the monetarist counter revolution. Along the way Carter writes a paean to John Kenneth Galbraith who, in my opinion after reading his “Affluent Society” and “The New Industrial State,” was a pompous moralist.

What upset me most about the book is Carter’s chapter entitled “The Aristocracy Strikes Back,” which was about the start of the monetarist counter-revolution led by Milton Friedman. In a fashion I played a very small part in that as I moved from the world IS-LM to the world of the M’s and rational expectations. Where I take umbrage is the word aristocracy. As a kid from Queens going to Baruch College, I was far being anywhere near being from the manner born.

Carter also makes short rift of the collapse of much of the Keynesian dogma in the stagflation of 1970s. Simply put, Keynesian economics stopped working. Nevertheless with the Great Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 and the current COVID crisis Keynes has been rightfully resurrected. Just to note in 2009 I was strong advocate of aggressive fiscal stimulus including a large public investment program that Keynes would have advocated. However I did attach a proviso that would have limited environmental review and prevailing wages. You see the America of 2020 is not the America of 1935. There is no such thing as shovel ready projects.

A few of my technical criticisms would include the fact that Carter gets the date of assassination of Franz Ferdinand in 1914 wrong. He has it on July 28, not June 28. This is not trivial because with his dating the stock market response to the assassination was instantaneous, when fact it wasn’t. He gives the cartoon version of Herbert Hoover, when, in fact, Hoover acted but did far less than what was needed. His cause of the 1937 recession was fiscal, when it was the result of the Treasury gold sterilization program, which was monetary. Further he leaves out the work of the late UCLA economist Axel Leijonhufvud who wrote on the economics of Keynes in a different manner than here.

Nevertheless, because he writes so well I can recommend Carter’s books. He is lucid in explaining macroeconomics in everyday terms; just take some of his ideology with more than a few grains of salt.

For the complete Amazon URL see: https://www.amazon.com/review/R2H7XL6UC6FH53/ref=pe_1098610_137716200_cm_rv_eml_rv0_rv

My Amazon Review of Donald Sassoon's "The Anxious Triumph: A Global History of Capitalism 1860-1914"

Global Capitalism 1.0

University of London history professor Donald Sassoon could have written a great book for the lay reader describing the first global epoch of capitalism. Unfortunately he took all of the drama out of one of the most dramatic eras in world economic history. Perhaps I am being too harsh because of my amateur status, but his 768 page book, although loaded with information, is a long and difficult slog.

Sassoon’s book lacks the drama of Marx’s 1848 “Communist Manifesto” where praises how the rising capitalist bourgeoisie was transforming Europe. Where Marx showed excitement Sassoon is plodding. Much later Keynes’s “Economic Consequences…” highlights what was available to England’s pre-war bourgeoisie with the mere dialing of a telephone (no telephones in 1860). It would have been nice if he described the life of the bourgeoisie and the working class of 1860 and compared it to that of 1914. The world changed for better for both classes. It would have helped if Sassoon studied Robert Gordon’s “The Rise and Fall of American Growth.” Remember that the first global age began with the telegraph and the steamship and ended with the telephone, electric lights and the internal combustion engine, all three invented around 1879. It was those three inventions created under capitalist auspices that changed the world.

For a history of capitalism, very few capitalists are mentioned. I was hoping to learn about the methods and vision of the European and Japanese capitalists who built their societies, but came away disappointed. The author describes the rise of capitalism in a host of countries, but he doesn’t put flesh and bones on it. He seems to be more interested in the political leadership than the rising capitalist class.

He further sets up a straw man by arguing that the neo-liberals of the 1980s harkened back to a capitalist nirvana of the 1860s when government’s role in the economy was small. He rightly states that government played a major role in capitalist development everywhere and practically all neo-liberals knew it. Sassoon favored more government involvement and he appears to be very sympathetic to the German protectionist of the 1840s Friedrich List.

Where Sassoon is good is his discussion on the huge profits Britain generated from the sale of opium to China and that colonialism, especially in Africa, wasn’t all that profitable for Europe. Most trade took place among the more developed countries. He also highlights that much of 19^th century America was built with European capital.

My sense is that only the nerdiest of lay readers will find this book of interest. There is a lot here but it takes time to plow through.

For the full Amazon URL see: https://www.amazon.com/review/R1EG4VG2S3487Z/ref=pe_1098610_137716200_cm_rv_eml_rv0_rv