Realpolitik Goes Awry
Anglo-German Historian Katja Hoyer has written a short
history of the Second Reich. The architect of the unification of Germany and
the creation of the empire was that master of realpolitik, Otto von Bismark.
Bismark was a master of both international and domestic politics. Domestically
he forged a union of thirty-nine separate states into a united Germany and
while Chancellor after unification he brilliantly played off the liberals
against the rising socialist party. From
1871-1890 he all but assumed the powers of Kaiser Wilhelm I who gave him full
reign.
Internationally he created the strongest power in
continental Europe through his swift victories in three wars. Aside from the
animosity of France he maintained excellent relations with Britain, Austria, and
Russia and thus the semblance of order was maintained. Although he had no
interest in colonies, he acquiesced to German commercial interests in
establishing a significant German presence in Africa. However, he assuaged both
Britain and France that he had no interest in taking them on in Africa. In
Europe he became the “honest broker” during the 1878 Congress of Berlin which
averted a Balkan crisis.
However, after Wilhelm II becomes Kaiser, Bismark is
dismissed in 1890 and there was no one to take his place. Even if Wilhelm II were
a wise ruler much of what Bismark achieved could have become undone. Of course,
history might have been different if Kaiser Friedrich had not died after 99
days in office. He was a reformer who likely would have avoided the worst
tendencies of his son, Wilhelm II. We will never know.
After Bismark leaves office, everything seems to fall
off the tracks. Internationally Wilhelm II allows Russia to fall into France’s
arms and thus Bismark’s nightmare of coalitions becomes very real. Wilhelm II
antagonizes Britain with an aggressive naval buildup and the path to war is
opened and with Germany wanting its “place in the sun” all of Europe is
threatened. Instead of being most everyone’s friend, Germany is perceived as an
enemy.
Domestically the socialists grow in strength and
become harder to appease under the stress of rising military budgets. The
center-right leadership fractures and by 1910 the drift is self-evident. The
German military fills the vacuum with deadly consequences.
I learned a lot from reading the book, but, in my
opinion, there are two real weaknesses. Hoyer underestimates the power of the
German economy which began to dominate world trade through its leading position
in the new industries of chemical, electrical engineering, and automobiles. The
global economy had to make room for Germany and the rising United States and
that would obviously create trade tensions. Second, there is not enough on the
decision to go to war in 1914. Much has been written about that, but I would
have like to get a better understanding of Hoyer’s take.
For the full Amazon URL see: Realpolitik Goes Awry (amazon.com)
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