Clausewitzian Realism in Service of the
State
Israeli journalist Ronen Bergman has written
a well-researched and readable book on Israel’s secret war of targeted
assassinations against its most feared enemies ranging from Iran to Hamas to
Hezbollah. In fact as I write this review there is a front page New York Times
story (8/7/18) on the assassination of a Syrian rocket scientist on the streets
of Damascus that was attributed to the Mossad which remains pound for pound the
best foreign security agency in the world. He starts in the pre-state era and
goes through 2015 and covers the three main organs of state security: Mossad
(external), Shin Bet (internal) and AMAN (military). He covers their great
successes and their failures. Unfortunately he is way too much of a critic for
my taste.
Bergman begins his book by quoting from
Talmud: “If someone comes to kill you, rise up and kill him first.” That in a
nutshell is the major lesson of his book because a small state surrounded by
enemies has to act preemptively if it is to survive. The state has to be a
Clausewitzian realist who understands to paraphrase Clausewitz “assassination
is the continuation of politics by other means.”
Perhaps the clearest example of realism
is when the Mossad hires former Waffen-SS Lieutenant Colonel and Hitler
favorite Otto Skorzeny to disrupt an Egyptian missile program in the early
1960s. At that time Nasser recruited World War II German rocket scientists to
develop missiles to attack Israel. The operation was a success. Just think about
this, Israel hiring a Nazi leader to defeat its current Egyptian enemy.
There are many stories like this with
hits taking place in Europe, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. Each and every one
had to be personally approved by the prime minister. Of course thing often went
awry, most notably during the 1982 Lebanon War. It is a high risk business
where the lives of the agents are at great risk and the mission can fail if
civilians are killed. However, unlike their opponents, the Israeli’s agonized
over the potential for collateral damage and actually called off operations
because of undue risk to non-targets.
Bergman’s main source for more recent
events appears to be former Mossad head Meir Dagan who ran the operation from
2003-2012. Dagan died in 2015 and was a harsh critic of Netanyahu, especially
with respect to his Iran policy. Bergman too dislikes Netanyahu but he more
kind to Sharon and Begin. I did not like Bergman using his pejorative term
“right wing” to describe the Likud faction. I would have used center-right.
After all he never called the Labor Party “left wing.”
Despite my criticisms Bergman has
written a terrific book. There is much to learn about Israeli tradecraft and
how their decision making process worked. And when one reads about operational
failures, the critic has to sit in the shoes of the decision makers at the time
the decision was made. In the spy business it is easy to be a Monday morning
quarterback. Bergman ends his book by noting that we can’t confuse tactical
success with strategic success. Israel’s strategic dilemma hasn’t much changed
since the aftermath of the 1967 war. It has yet to reach a long term settlement
with the Palestinians and still faces a very hostile Iran.
For the full Amazon URL see: https://www.amazon.com/review/R1PFY89UKBK8SG/ref=pe_1098610_137716200_cm_rv_eml_rv0_rv
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