Making War
Historian
and media personality Michael Beschloss has written an important history of how
and why presidents took us to war and of their wartime decision making process
from Madison to Johnson. He is at is best in discussing the role of Lyndon
Johnson during the Vietnam War. His “tick-tock” of how the Gulf of Tonkin
resolution came to be is worth the price of the book. He is very clear that the
Johnson administration was deceitful from Day One when they knew in their heart
of hearts the war wasn’t winnable. Where I would fault him is that he does not
lay enough of a predicate as to the role of John Kennedy in the lead up to the
war. After all Johnson was continuing Kennedy’s very aggressive policy with
respect to Vietnam.
Beschloss
opens his book at the end of the Jefferson administration in 1807 and then
fully discusses Madison’s role in the War of 1812. To me he is not critical
enough of Madison and Jefferson. In my mind both were guilty of dereliction of
duty in failing to maintain adequate naval strength while both Britain and
France were raiding our ships and impressing our seaman. They both, having witnessed
the Seven Years War that a generalized European conflict would sooner or later
make its appearance in the Americas. Although
England was not directly threatening the U.S., Madison was egged on by the “war
hawks” Henry Clay and John C. Calhoun to declare war. Be that as it may for the
young trading nation that the U.S. was, the principle of freedom of the seas
was worth going to war over.
He next is
very critical of James K. Polk. To be sure Polk created an incident to trigger
the Mexican War and lied to the American people about it, but to my mind Polk
was the Bismarck of North America. Polk had the strategic vision that a war
with Mexico would bring with it the entire southwest as well as California. He was
fulfilling “manifest destiny,” a term that came into use during his administration.
But before Polk could go to war with Mexico he had to settle up the Oregon
dispute with Great Britain, which he did. Polk was smart enough to realize that
U.S. could not fight a two front war against both Mexico and Britain.
Lincoln, of
course, comes across as the great Civil War leader that he was. He does this
not only by ultimate success on the battlefield, but by elevating the purpose
of the war to give rise to “a new birth of freedom.” Unlike other presidents
Lincoln was able to witness and agonize over battlefield casualties he was also
able to be decisive. Where I would be
critical of Beschloss is that while the fighting was going on Lincoln pushed through
Congress three great Hamiltonian projects, the Homestead Act, the Pacific
Railway Act and the Morrill Act(land grant colleges), quite a domestic program.
This distinguishes Lincoln from other presidents, where domestic engagements
gave way to wartime exigencies.
Beschloss is
kind to McKinley. After the sinking of the Maine (an accident) in Havana
Harbor, he does not rush into war. However once engaged McKinley becomes an
all-in imperialist by taking the Philippines, Guam and Puerto Rico. Intended or
not with the Spanish American War the U.S. enter the world stage.
Beschloss
likes Wilsonian policies, but he doesn’t seem to like Woodrow Wilson. He comes
across as an arrogant intellectual and where Wilson demonstrated great
political acumen in passing his domestic program, he is a complete disaster on
the world stage. Wilson’s thought process on entering the war is a “theme park”
(my words) for executive indecision. In his discussion of Wilson, Beschloss
leaves out a lot. He ignores the role of the March Revolution in Russia that
made it easier for Wilson to argue that he was “making the world safe for
democracy.” He also ignores the challenge that Lenin brings with the November
Revolution. Many historians believe that his 14 Points were a response to Lenin.
He also only skims through the wave of domestic repression that took place
during the war and immediately thereafter. And he ignores Wilson’s hidden
agenda, which he accomplished, of orchestrating the transfer of economic power
from London to New York.
Roosevelt,
on the other hand learns from Wilson’s mistakes. Instead of trying to keep the
U.S. out of the Second World War, he molds public opinion into acceptance of
the inevitability of a war against fascism. He also brings the Republicans on
board, both before and after, something Wilson refused to do. Roosevelt learned
what not to do when he was an assistant secretary of the navy in the Wilson
Administration. He also brings in the American people, with his fireside chats,
into the vast theater of the global war.
Truman does
not come off well. He doesn’t bring Congress into the process and that with
hostile opposition from the likes of Taft and McCarthy leads to huge problems
when the Korean War stalemates on the battlefield. After he rightfully fires
General MacArthur his popularity plummets. It is a sad ending for someone who
so clearly understood the Soviet menace in the late 1940s to see him so
pilloried.
As I said at
the outset Beschloss has written an important book, but as I noted he left out
quite a bit and in many cases, especially with the earlier presidents he was
way too detailed and the average lay reader will likely get bogged down in the
weeds. Hence four stars, not five.
