The Nixon Shock
Former Yale School of Management Dean and long-time
economic policy official in the Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Clinton
administrations as well as being husband of Ina Garten, the Food Network’s
Barefoot Contessa; Jeffrey Garten placed you in the room where global monetary
policy was upended over an August weekend in 1971. Garten offers keen insights
into the personalities in the room at Camp David. Of course there is Nixon
whole loved to do bold and daring things, there is his Secretary of the
Treasury John Connally who was the super hawk on trade and who was completely
transactional, there was Arthur Burns the pipe smoking and vacillating Fed
Chief, there was Peter Peterson forward thinking Nixon policy advisor, there
was William Safire, the man who would write Nixon’s speech and there was Paul
Volcker, the Under-Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Policy who knew more
about what they were about to do than anybody else. And although Henry Kissinger wasn’t present he
had to deal with the after effects of of upsetting America’s allies.
What they did that weekend was to take the United
States off the gold exchange standard which was the foundation of international
economic policy since the 1944 Bretton Woods agreement. What they also did was
enact a 90-day price and wage freeze which would ultimately turn into an
unmanageable regime of wage and price controls that would last for a few years.
They also put a 15% tariff on European and Japanese imports upending the United
States’ postwar free trade policy. It truly was the Nixon shock. U.S stocks
initially rallied and Japanese stocks crashed.
Garten explains in a nontechnical manner how the U.S.
was running out of gold to back its currency and the economy was suffering from
a bout of stagflation with rising inflation and unemployment. Although he
doesn’t specifically mention it, Garten was writing about the Triffin Dilemma
where the supplier of a global reserve currency has to continually supply
increasing reserves to the world and in order to do that it has to run a
balance of payments deficit. Thus, in the summer of 1971 U.S. gold reserves
stood at $10 billion while foreign central banks had accumulated $40 billion in
claims. Simply put we were broke.
Garten starts his story in the late 1960’s when in
fact he should have started it in November 1960 when after Kennedy’s election
the price of gold soared from its fixed $35 an ounce to $40 an ounce. The
market feared a U.S. devaluation which last occurred in 1933. The Kennedy Administration talked the market
down but from then on, the balance of payments issue outlined by Triffin was
top of mind among economic policy officials.
Although it didn’t happen right away the Camp David
meeting set into motion the transition away from fixed exchange rates to
floating exchange rates, a regime we live under to this day. It also signaled
that balance of payments considerations would no longer affect domestic
monetary and fiscal policy opening the way to very expansive policies. After
all Nixon wanted a booming economy to get re-elected. He got it and along with
OPEC the way was open to the 1970’s inflation. Garten, I think rightly argues
that the Nixon team didn’t have much of a choice with respect to leaving the
gold exchange standard but was horribly wrong with respect to wage and price
controls.
One of the things that impressed me was Garten’s
insights into John Connally. Connally was a brilliant synthesizer of complex
information and he greatly respected Paul Volcker. He backed him to the hilt
even when Nixon had his doubts. He also writes very favorably about Peter
Peterson who ultimately hired him at Lehman Brothers and later at Blackstone.
How influenced he was by his friendship with him, the reader does not know.
Lastly as with Nixon’s sense of the dramatic, only one month before Nixon
upended 30 years of U.S. policy by announcing his visit to China. All I can say the heads of my left-liberal
friends were spinning as Nixon adopted many of their policies.
Jeffrey Garten has given us great insights as to how a
major policy decision was made and the importance of the personalities
involved. I highly recommend the book.
For the full Amazon URL see: The Nixon Shock (amazon.com)