The Great Depression Showdown over Gold
As an economic history nerd I can only
applaud the work of my UCLA colleague Sebastian Edwards in his vibrant telling
the story of the long forgotten Supreme Court showdown over the United States’
abrogation of contracts written with the gold clause. Remembering the inflation
of the Civil War greenback era, most creditors demanded gold clauses in debt
contracts in which they would be repaid in in either gold or its paper money equivalent
value.
This system worked fine until the onset
of the Great Depression. It is here where Edwards begins his story as President
Roosevelt adopts an inflationist policy by first abandoning the gold standard
by requiring all citizens to turn in their physical gold at the then $20.67/ounce
price. Then in June 1933 Congress adopts a joint resolution authorizing
Roosevelt to increase the price of gold which he ultimately does to $35/ounce
and the legislation abrogates the gold clause in all contracts. Indeed, most
economists credit the early recovery from the depression directly to the
monetary easing associated with Roosevelt’s gold policies.
If Congress hadn’t abrogated the gold
clause all debts would have been written up to reflect the devaluation by 69%.
Thus it would require a payment of approximately $1700 to repay a nominal debt
of $1,000. Needless to say a host of bankruptcies would have ensued.
Of course several creditors sued and
Edwards skillfully moves the action from Roosevelt and Congress to the Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court ruled that it was in Congress’ power to alter private
contracts, but it was not in its power to alter U.S. government debt. However,
the court ruled that as of the date of the Joint Resolution gold was still
trading at $20.67/ounce and Americans were not allowed to possess physical gold
at that time. Hence there would be no damages. A brilliant 5-4 ruling by Chief
Justice Hughes.
The reason why these cases have been
forgotten is that if they went the other way all hell would have broken loose.
Instead of rallying as the stock market did after the ruling, stocks likely
would have crashed. It would have triggered a constitutional crisis with Court
versus the other two branches of government. Indeed the lead up to the ruling
was a precursor to the 1937 court fight that Roosevelt would have.
As an aside Edwards notes that the
United States had a treaty with Panama concerning the lease payments for the
Panama Canal. That treaty had a gold clause in it. After a long negotiation in 1939
the lease payment was increased retroactive to 1934 thereby reflecting the
dollar devaluation. Thus, the U.S. made good on its international treaty
obligations.
“American Default” is a worthy addition
to the economics literature of the Great Depression. It should be read with the
works of Friedman & Schwartz, Bernanke, Irwin, Eichengreen and Sumner. And
because it is more a history book than an economics book the lay reader should
find it very readable. Further given the rising debt/GDP ratio in the U.S. when
coupled with even larger unfunded liabilities, the idea of a 21st
century American default is not totally improbable.
The full amazon URL appears at: https://www.amazon.com/review/R1JCSUKKX3TVDP/ref=pe_1098610_137716200_cm_rv_eml_rv0_rv
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