First Pass at Trumponomics: From a
Reckless Monetary to a Reckless Fiscal Policy
David
Shulman
Senior
Economist, Senior Economist UCLA Anderson Forecast
December
2016
Contrary to prior expectations, stocks
soared and interest rates surged on the election of Donald Trump. (See Figures
1 and 2) It seems that both the stock and bond markets were pricing in the
radical reversal in fiscal policy occasioned by his election while ignoring the
negative impacts of his immigration and trade policies. Put bluntly the markets
are now anticipating stronger real growth, at least for a while, higher
inflation and higher interest rates. We believe that the markets have got it
right with respect to direction.
Figure 1. S&P 500, Nov. 26, 2015 –
Nov. 25, 2016, Daily Data
Source: Standard and Poor’s via
Bigcharts.com
Figure 2. 10-Year U.S. Treasury Bond
Yield, Nov. 26, 2015 – Nov. 25, 2016, Daily Data
Bigcharts.com
Our first pass at Trumponomics, which
still remains quite vague, makes the following policy assumptions:
·
$300 billion/year
annual mostly higher end personal tax cuts effective in Q3.
·
$200 billion/year
corporate tax cut effective in Q3 with $50 billion of revenues associated with
the repatriation of foreign earnings that quarter.
·
$20 billion/year
infrastructure program effective in Q4.
·
$20 billion in
higher defense spending in 2018.
·
$20 billion/year
Medicaid/ACA cuts effective in Q4.
·
Relaxed energy,
environmental and financial regulation.
·
Modest changes to
immigration except for border wall/fence.
·
Modest changes to
trade policy yielding net reductions in food and aircraft exports phasing in
starting mid-2017.
The net result is a massive fiscal
stimulus on an economy at or very close to full employment and is directionally
what a host of liberal economists have been advocating for the past five years.
To be sure the mix tax cuts and spending is far different from what they
desired, but make no mistake this is real or even reckless fiscal stimulus. How
so? The federal deficit will roughly
double to over one trillion dollars by 2018. (See Figure 3) Simply put an economy operating
at full employment should not have a deficit equal to 5% of GDP; the budget
should be in balance or in surplus. Thus in the next recession the federal
deficit will make the deficits associated with the financial crisis look small.
In a way policy going policy will be the
mirror image of the past five years as the reckless zero interest rate/QE
policy gives way to its fiscal equivalent. Further Europe will follow the
U.S. with more aggressive fiscal policies to meet the growing populist
challenge.
Figure 3. Federal Deficit, FY2007 -FY2018F
Sources: Office of Management and Budget
and UCLA Annual Forecast
In response to higher inflation and the
exploding federal deficit the long quiescent Fed will become more aggressive
with respect to monetary policy. This month’s expected increase in the federal
funds rate will be followed up with many more pushing the rate up to above 2%
by the end of 2017 and above 3% by the end of 2018. (See Figure 4) Remember President Trump has two vacancies
to fill right away and Chair Yellen’s term expires in January 2018. Trust
me; we will have a much different Fed under President Trump. Similarly the
yield on 10-year U.S. Treasury Bonds is forecast to exceed 3% by the end of
2017 and 4% by the end of 2018. We know
this sounds aggressive but it looks like we are in for, what economists call, a
regime change.
Figure 4. Federal Funds vs. 10-Year U.S.
Treasury Bonds, 2007Q1 -2018Q4F
Sources: Federal Reserve Board and UCLA
Anderson Forecast
With $500 billion in tax cuts arriving
in the third quarter of 2017 we expect economic growth to accelerate from the
recent 2% growth path to 3% for about four quarters. Thereafter growth will
slip back to 2%. (See Figure 5) Why so little? First it is hard to stimulate an
economy operating at about full employment and second the higher interest rates
we foresee will begin to bite. In order to maintain 3% growth or higher the
economy will need a productivity miracle. Whether that will come from as the
Trump partisans expect the supposed supply side effects of the tax cuts and the
proposed regulatory reforms remains to be seen. We would also note that our
forecast is likely higher than what Trump’s Democratic opposition would expect.
Figure 5. Real GDP Growth, 2007Q1
-2018Q4F, Percent Change, SAAR
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce and
UCLA Anderson Forecast
In this environment employment will
continue to grow with job growth on the order of 140,000 a month in calendar
2017 and 120,000 a month in calendar 2018. (See Figure 6) To be sure if the new administration follows through with its campaign
rhetoric to engage in mass deportations then job growth and the economic
activity associated with it would be far slower than what we forecast. The
unemployment rate is forecast to fall to around 4.5% by the end of 2017 and
remain there through 2018. (See Figure 7) Further as the labor market tightens wage
growth will accelerate to 4% or more from the middle of 2017 on. (See Figure 8)
Figure 6. Payroll Employment, 2007Q1 –
2018Q4F
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics and
UCLA Anderson Forecast
Figure 7. Unemployment Rate 2007Q1 –
2018Q4F
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
and UCLA Anderson Forecast
Figure 8. Compensation/Hour, 2007Q1 -2018Q4F
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics and
UCLA Anderson Forecast
With year over year core inflation
already rising above 2%, it should no surprise to anyone that this rate will
accelerate to at least a 2.5% pace; a forecast we view as conservative. (See
Figure 9) As oil prices rebound headline inflation will approach 3%. Therefore
if we are roughly right about the economy operating at full employment with an
unemployment rate of 4.5%, inflation exceeding 2.5% and the prospect of a one
trillion dollar annual federal deficit, it should surprise no one that interest
rates would be heading much higher.
Figure 9. Consumer Price Index, Headline
vs. Core Inflation, 2007Q1 -2018Q4,
The
Good, the Bad and the Ugly
The
Good
The economic growth we envision will be
powered by rising consumption, equipment and defense spending. Real consumption
spending is forecast to increase at 3% and 3.7% in 2017 and 2018, respectively
compared to 2.6% this year. (See Figure 10) Consumption growth will dampened by
an increase in the saving rate as high end consumers stash some of their tax
savings and benefit as well from the rise in interest rates. (See Figure 11)
The saving rate rises from 5.7% in 2016 to 7.6% in 2018.
Figure 10. Real Consumption Spending,
2007 -2018F, Percent Change, Annual Data
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce and
UCLA Anderson Forecast
Figure 11. Saving Rate, 2007 – 2018F
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce and
UCLA Anderson Forecast
Responding to lower corporate taxes and
the likelihood of 100% expensing for tax purposes equipment spending is
forecast to rebound from a 2.2% decline in 2016. Although we maybe on the
conservative side here, we are forecasting increases of 4.5% and 6% in 2017 and
2018, respectively. (See Figure 12) Although the Trump plan includes 100%
expensing for buildings along with the elimination of the business interest
deduction, we are not sure this part of the plan will be enacted. This aspect
of his plan raises a host of issues to geeky to discuss here.
See Figure 12. Real Equipment Spending,
2007 – 2018
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce and
UCLA Anderson Forecast
We have been forecasting a turnaround in
defense purchases over the past two years. With the election of President Trump
it is upon us. After declining six years in a row real defense spending is
forecast to increase by 0.8% and 3.2% in 2017 and 2018, respectively. (Figure
13) This is one spending priority that is expected to achieve broad support.
Figure 13. Real Defense Purchases, 2007
– 2018F, Percent Change, Annual Data
U.S. Department of Commerce and UCLA
Anderson Forecast
The
Bad
Housing activity will likely be a
casualty of the economic environment we envision. The speed of the recent spike
in long term interest rates and the prospect of further increases will dampen
housing demand. Instead of the 1.4 million level of housing starts that we were
previously looking for in 2017 and 2018, we are now looking for a far more
modest level of starts in 1.2 million – 1.25 million range. (See Figure 14) To
be sure this is an increase from this 2016’s estimated 1.17 million starts, but
far below what we perceive to be underlying demographic demand of 1.5 million
units per year.
Figure 14. Housing Starts, 2007Q1 -2018Q4F
Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census and
UCLA Anderson Forecast
The
Ugly
Although President-elect Trump raged
against imports and the trade deficit during the campaign, it looks like he
will come up woefully short. Why? The consumer boom that his tax cuts will
ignite will inevitably suck in imports. Further the change in policy mix from
monetary policy to fiscal policy triggered a rally in the dollar making imports
cheaper and exports more expensive. Recall
where we started, we are not assuming a major trade war with our partners around
the world. If we are wrong here we are
likely wrong everywhere. We are assuming that there will be minor tweaks to
trade policy that would modestly reduce imports (mostly in the auto sector) and
trigger modest retaliatory actions affecting aircraft and farm exports. As a
result imports continue to rise and exports flat-line. (See Figure 15 and 16)
Figure 15. Real Imports, 2007 -2018F
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce and
UCLA Anderson Forecast
Figure 16. Real Exports, 2007 -2017F, Annual
Data, Percent Change
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce and
UCLA Anderson Forecast
The slowdown in trade that we envision
is, unfortunately, only the beginning as the broad postwar consensus favoring
open markets has broken down. The bi-partisan collapse of the Trans Pacific
Partnership (TPP) and the Brexit vote signaled that we are moving to a more
protectionist world and the age of ever increasing globalism is over, at least
for now. The world will be a poorer place for it.
A
Note on Infrastructure Spending
We do not believe that President-elect
Trump’s tax credit based infrastructure plan will pass muster in Congress on
the scale he is looking for. Simply put
he is proposing $137 billion in tax credits for private investors to fund major
infrastructure projects. The problem is that in order for this to work it
requires a revenue stream and there aren’t any revenue streams associated with
highway, bridge and tunnel, wastewater and transit maintenance. Thus we
anticipate a more traditional infrastructure program amounting to a more modest
$20 billion dollars a year of direct taxpayer funding. We could very well be low here, but it will
take time for an expanded infrastructure program to ramp up.
Nowadays as President Obama discovered
to his chagrin there are very few “shovel ready” infrastructure projects around
awaiting funding. We live in a world of environmental impact studies and
Davis-Bacon Act labor codes regarding prevailing wages. Thus if the President-elect
wants quick action Congress would have to waive or fast-track the environmental
requirements and waive provisions of the Davis-Bacon Act. This would be a tough
sell for the Democrats, but the Republicans are in the majority.
A
Note on the Deficit
Several my colleagues have cautioned me
about the so-called “deficit hawks” in the Republican Party who would fight
fiercely against the projected one trillion dollar deficit we are calling for
in 2018. My response is that the Republicans want Trump to succeed and they
won’t fight him. This is very similar to the evangelical wing of the Republican
Party holding its nose and supporting Trump, whose life story certainly raised serious
questions for that faction, in the general election against Hillary Clinton. Moreover the Trump Republican Party is not
the party of Reagan; it is more a Jacksonian working class party that cares
more about jobs than deficits.
Conclusion
The election of Donald Trump signaled a
major regime change in economic policy. We are transitioning form a reckless monetary
policy to a reckless fiscal policy. In the short run that will bring with it
more real growth and inflation along with higher interest rates. However,
because the economy is operating at or close to full employment, the growth
spurt will be short-lived and we will return to the 2% growth economy of the
past seven years. However we will be left with mega-deficits that will make it
more difficult to fund the retirement and health programs that voters expect. And the real risk is that a more aggressive
Trump Administration trade policy would trigger a growth killing trade war.
Thus we would caution that because there are so many ill-defined moving parts
there is higher degree of uncertainty in this forecast compared to prior ones.