Fixing the Banks
Mervyn King, the former governor of The
Bank of England, has written a very readable book on the interaction of money
and banking on the global economy. He offers his insights as a practical banker
and a serious economist for the way forward from the financial crisis of
2007-09 that we are still reeling from.
Although he discusses a host of topics
relating to how people make decisions in practice compared to how economic
theory suggests they behave, the problems of the fixed exchange rate regime
within the European Union, and the difficulties of making policy within a
framework of competing nations; I will focus on two issues that he raised.
The first is his suggested reform for
the banking system. His reform is a modified “Chicago Plan” of the 1930s which
called for 100% reserves. Under that regime bank deposits would be matched with
cash and short term government securities. Hence no risk and no potential for
bank runs. In contrast the current system is based on fractional reserves where
banks hold a small portion of their deposits in reserves and lend out the
balance. This process is King’s alchemy where short maturity deposits are transformed into long
term assets. In the jargon of economists this process is called “maturity transformation.”
This system is inherently unstable
because the cash is not there to pay off depositors if they want all of their
money at once. To deal with this contradiction the central bank acts as a
lender of last resort to meet the demands of anxious depositors. This gives
rise to the issue of “too big to fail.” King’s compromise is to turn the
central bank into a “pawnbroker for all seasons.” Under his proposed system
banks must hold sufficient reserves, liquid assets and discounted long term
assets to meet all deposit and short term borrowing liabilities. The discounted
assets would be valued at a “normal times” value with an appropriate “hair-cut”
to allow for risk and those asset could
be pawned at the central bank should the need arise. Any lending above this
threshold would have to be funded by additional equity and long term
liabilities. Thus depositors would feel secure that their money be there when
they needed it.
All this is fine and good, except there
would be very little incentive for banks to make risky loans. Why is that bad?
It is bad because new businesses, new ideas and new construction have to be
funded if the economy is going to achieve the growth that most of us desire. To
undertake King’s reforms we would need new institutions to undertake those risks.
King is silent on this question.
The other issue that King raises that I
would like to discuss is that the universal answer to all financial crises is
to throw central bank money at it. We have been doing this for nine years. The
problem that King rightly raises is that if the problem is structural rather
than liquidity, throwing money at the crisis will delay solving the structural
imbalances. To King’s mind central bankers in this environment may set interest
rates too high to permit growth, but too low to allow for a structural
adjustment.
The issue in the West is that savings
are too low, while in the East consumption is too low. For example in order for
the U.S. to cure its chronic trade deficit the savings rate has to rise and
consumption has to fall, while China’s huge trade surplus has to be cured by
higher consumption and lower savings. Politically asking people to reduce
consumption is a hard sell so the easy way out is to keep interest rates low
that works to keep consumption up.
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