T.G. Otte, a Professor of Diplomatic
History at the University of East Anglia, has written an exhaustive and
difficult to read study of the diplomatic maneuvers undertaken by the major
powers on the eve of World War I. He covers the period from the assassination
of the Archduke Ferdinand on June 28, 1914 to Britain’s entry into the war the
following August 4th on a day-by-day basis. The problem for the lay
reader is that there are way too many characters and you have to continually
update your score card to understand what is going on.
Otte is not interested in the broad
historical forces that caused World War I, but rather he focuses in on the
flesh and blood human beings who by their actions precipitated the war. His
theme is similar to Margaret Macmillan’s “The War that Ended Peace…..” which
discusses how the major powers increasingly narrowed their options making war
more or less inevitable. Instead of taking 24 years to narrow options, the
diplomats in his story take less than six weeks as peaceful option after
peaceful option is foreclosed upon.
Otte has a set of clear villains. They
are the Austria-Hungary leadership, mainly Foreign Minister Berchtold, who are
so narrowly focused on Serbia; they fail to understand the European
consequences of their actions. They are the “Sleepwalkers” Christopher Clark
writes about. Next are the Germans, Kaiser Wilhelm, Chancellor Hollweg and
Foreign Minister Jagow, who issue the “blank check” to Austria on July 5th
thereby surrendering their foreign policy to that narrowly focused dying
empire.
Other diplomats singled out for blame
include Maurice Paleologue, the French Ambassador to Russia, who conveys far
more hawkish sentiments than that of his government to his Russian
counter-party Foreign Minister Sazanov. Had Paleologue been more discreet and
Sazanov less aggressive, the Russian mobilization of July 29th might
have been delayed giving more time for diplomacy.
Britain’s Sir Edward Grey comes off the
best as he frantically tried to come up with diplomatic solutions to the
crisis. This is a different take because many historians blame Grey for not
forcefully signaling Germany that Britain would enter the war on the side of
France thereby acting a major deterrent. Here Grey is the neutral mediator. I
am not sure what to believe. One last point when Otte discusses the role of
Eyre Crow an Assistant Under-Secretary in the foreign office rather than being
an above the fray civil servant, he fails to disclose that he was the long time
anti-German hawk in British foreign policy circles.
For the Amazon URL see: http://www.amazon.com/review/R26M9257ZKBDTR
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