Thursday, March 28, 2019

My Amazon Review of Idina Hoffman's "Ben Hecht: Fighting Words, Moving Pictures


On the Front Page of the Twentieth Century

Adina Hoffman has written an important biography the great screen writer Ben Hecht. She takes his life from the Lower Eastside of the 1890s, to Racine, Wisconsin, and then on to the newspaper world of Chicago, to Broadway and then on to Hollywood. In the 1930s Hecht became the highest paid screen writer in Hollywood turning out such classics as Scarface, Viva Villa, Gunga Din, Twentieth Century, Monkey Business and Wuthering Heights. He would also rewrite without credit Gone with the Wind, The Shop around the Corner, Mutiny on the Bounty and much later Casino Royal. Quite the career.

While in Chicago he would meet Sherwood Anderson, Carl Sandberg and Theodore Dreiser all of whom would later become literary giants. It was his experience in Chicago newsrooms that inspired his Broadway hit, Front Page. Also as a reporter he covered postwar Berlin in 1919.

Hecht received perhaps the most famous telegram in all of Hollywood history. In late 1926 while in New York he received a telegram from his friend Herman Mankiewicz stating,

   “Will you accept three hundred per week to work for Paramount Pictures.
      All expenses paid. ……..”

And as they say, the rest is history.

Perhaps most interesting to me is how Hecht rediscovers his Jewishness in 1939-40 with the onset of World War II and the growing horror facing European Jewry.  He meets up with Peter Bergson who was the Irgun’s (Jewish liberation group) man in the United States and starts raising dollars to rescue the Jews of Europe. In 1943 he puts on an extravaganza in Madison Square Garden highlighting the plight of European Jewry titled “We Will Never Die.” He is assisted in the work with such show business legends as Billie Rose, Moss Hart and Ernst Lubitsch. The show would go national. Along the way he battles the then Jewish establishment figures who were reluctant to highlight the seriousness of the disaster.

Later in 1946 he works with Bergson to put on a Broadway show entitled “A Flag is Born” to call attention to the struggle to create the Jewish state. Again he uses is influence to raise money for the cause. He was so important that future Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin would attend his funeral.

I would have really liked to know Ben Hecht. He was vibrant and full of energy and Adina Hoffman tells his story well.






Monday, March 25, 2019

My Amazon Review of Raghuram Rajan's "The Third Pillar: How Markets and the State Leave the Community Behind"


Inclusive Localism

Raghuram Rajan, a University of Chicago finance professor, former Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, former Chief Economist at the IMF and the one who blew the whistle on the dangers embedded in the derivatives markets at a 2005 Federal Reserve conference has written an important book on the political crisis of our time. Unfortunately it is too long and too dry. That said he is spot on in noting how the state and the market has taken over the historical role of community in our society. No wonder folks are alienated.

He focuses in on the communities that have been left out of the global economy over the past fifty years from rural towns, isolated factory communities and the inner city. All of this being exacerbated by a flood of immigrants who put downward pressure on low end wages and upward pressure on rents and the geographic sorting of the global elites in very expensive neighborhoods and metropolitan areas making upward mobility difficult. Because the major urban centers have become so expensive Rajan focuses on place-based strategies as opposed to people-based strategies to uplift the left behind. He focuses on what he calls “inclusive localism.” By that he means that wealthy communities have to affirmatively loosen up their planning controls and society as a whole has to invest in infrastructure in poorer communities.

However this is all too easy to say and very difficult to implement. Wealthy communities are not opening their doors and for poorer communities to uplift themselves there has to be a requisite amount of indigenous leadership ready and willing to take charge.

My own view is that inclusive localism would be far easier to implement if we returned to the 100 year old ideology of the melting pot. I know this is not politically correct, but it largely worked for white America and probably can work for all of America today. If we are to have inclusive communities there is going to have to a lot give from all corners. It sort of comes down to that old saying of “think globally and act locally.” Further it would help if we had a program of national service where young people of different backgrounds are forced to work together on common goals and it would also help if the elite universities radically increased their class size to accommodate more students.

Rajan closes the book with his global solution to today’s economic problems. To me that is a bridge too far and ought to be the subject of a different book.





Friday, March 22, 2019

Quoted In the WSJ, "Trump Offers Fed Board Position to Economic Commentator Stephen Moore," Mar 22, 2019 Online


Reaction to Mr. Moore’s selection suggested a contentious Senate confirmation battle could loom. “He’s a complete ideologue, and what the Fed doesn’t need is a complete ideologue,” said David Shulman, senior economist at the UCLA Anderson Forecast. “He’s very sycophantic to the president. Trump found his toady.”

Find the full story at the link below:


https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-offers-fed-board-position-to-economic-commentator-stephen-moore-11553265752 (paywall)

Monday, March 18, 2019

"Global Slowdown," UCLA Anderson Forecast, March 2019


Global Slowdown
David Shulman
Senior Economist
UCLA Anderson Forecast
March 2019

A year ago we were looking forward to a synchronized global expansion; today we are staring a synchronized slowdown. The U.S. economy is part and parcel with the global slowdown, an eventuality we have been forecasting for over a year. After growing at 3.1% clip on a fourth quarter-to-fourth quarter basis in 2018, growth will slow to 1.7% in 2019 and to a near recession pace of 1.1% in 2020. However by mid-2021 growth is once again forecast to be around 2%. (See Figure 1) Similarly payroll employment growth is forecast to decline from the 220,000 a month recorded in 2018 to about 160,000 a month in 2019 to a negligible 20,000 a month in 2020 with actual declines occurring at the end of that year. (See Figure 2) In this environment the unemployment rate will initially decline from January’s 3.9% to 3.6% later in the year and then gradually rise to 4.2% in early 2021. (See Figure 3)

Figure 1. Real GDP Growth, 2011Q1 -2021Q4F, Percent Change SAAR






Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Figure 2. Payroll Employment, 2011Q1 -2021Q4, Millions, SAAR



Sources: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and UCLA Anderson Forecast
Figure 3. Unemployment Rate, 2011Q1 -2021Q4, Percent, SAAR







Sources: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Why the Slowdown?

Consistent with our view for the past several quarters we believe that the 3% growth in 2018 was a one-off based on the fiscal stimulus coming from the tax cuts and spending increases, especially for defense enacted in late 2017 and the lagged effects of the extraordinarily easy monetary policy pursued by the Federal Reserve. With the effects of the fiscal stimulus now waning combined with the partial normalization of interest rates it seemed inevitable to us that growth would slow. Further the failure of housing activity to provide a propellant for the expansion has been a distinct negative. We will discuss these points in greater detail later. The slowdown in U.S. economic activity will be exacerbated by concomitant weakness among our global trading partners.

 Global Economy Stalling

Although 2018 started out strong for the global economy, by yearend there seemed to be weakness everywhere. The weakness is being amplified by the protectionist policies being employed by the Trump Administration and the uncertainties associated with BREXIT. For example compared to 2018 German growth is expected to slow from 1.5% to 1.3%, China from 6.6% to 6.2% and Italy is for all practical purposes in recession. Although these declines in growth appear modest, recent data suggests that there will be substantial downward revisions to the outlook once first quarter data become available.[i]  The global weakness will be transmitted to the U.S. economy by a less than robust export environment and a reduction in corporate profits.



See Figure 4. Real GDP Growth for Major Economies, 2018 -2020, Percent

Region/Country
2018
2019
2020
U.S.
2.9
2.5
1.8
Euro Zone
1.8
1.6
1.7
  Germany
1.5
1.3
1.6
  France
1.5
1.5
1.6
  Italy
1.0
0.6
0.9
UK
1.4
1.5
1.6
Japan
0.9
1.1
0.5
Developing Asia
  China
6.6
6.2
6.2
  India
7.3
7.5
7.7
Americas
  Canada
2.1
1.9
1.7
  Mexico
2.1
2.1
2.2
  Brazil
1.3
2.5
2.2

Source: World Economic Outlook, International Monetary Fund, January 2019

This economic weakness has triggered a major contraction in global interest rates making it difficult for the Fed to conduct its normalization policy and has put a lid on long term interest rates. Would you believe .09% for the German 10-year Bund and a negative .60% for the 2-year. (See Figure 5) Where in the recent past we thought yields on 10-year U.S. Treasury would to top out over 4%, we now think that a 3.25% peak is more likely as German interest rates work to suppress U.S. yields. (See Fed discussion below)

Figure 5. Selected Global Interest Rates, 22Feb19, Percent

Country
2-Year
10-Yr.
U.S.
2.50
2.65
Germany
-0.60
0.09
France
-0.46
0.52
Italy
0.54
2.87
U.K.
0.74
1.15
Japan
-0.18
-0.05
                               
Source: CNBC

A Fundamental Shift in Fed Policy

The combination of the global slowdown, the 20% sell-off in stock prices in the fourth quarter and still quiescent inflation triggered a fundamental shift in Fed policy. Instead of penciling three or four rate hikes next year, it now looks like it will be zero or one. We are in the one rate hike camp for 2019 camp because we believe that inflation will be less than benign. However, because we are more pessimistic on the real economy than the Fed, we are forecasting that there will be three rate cuts of 25 basis points each in 2020. (See Figure 6) In this setting of very slow growth and an end to the Fed normalization process coupled with very low interest rates in Europe and Japan it is hard to see long term interest rates going much above 3.25%.

Figure 6. Federal Funds vs. 10-Year U.S. Treasury Bonds, 2011Q1 -2021Q4F



Sources: Federal Reserve Board and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Moreover it now looks like the Fed is rethinking its balance sheet target. Instead or contracting its balance sheet from the $4.5 trillion peak to $3 trillion or below, it now looks like the shrinkage process will end this year with a balance sheet of around $3.5 trillion. (Figure 7) This change in policy will put less pressure on the long end of the treasury curve.

Figure 7. Federal Reserve Assets, 20Feb14 – 20Feb19, In $billions

 

Source: Federal Reserve Board via FRED

Although there has been much discussion of the potential for the treasury curve to become fully inverted (long rates lower than short rates), we do not believe that will be the case. To be sure the curve is currently inverted between one and five year maturities, but we do not believe that the all-important 90- Day Treasury Bill to the 10-Year Treasury bond will invert.(See Figure 8) Similarly we do not believe the 2-10 year spread will invert on a sustained basis as well.  

Figure 8. U.S. Treasury Yield Curve 22Feb19


Source: GuruFocus.com

Modestly Higher Inflation

Inflation may not be as quiescent as the Fed thinks. As a result of the very tight labor market wages are increasing at a 3%+ clip and it is likely that the year-over-year gains will soon be running around 4%. (See Figure 9) As a result, wage pressures, especially in the service sector, will keep the core consumer prices increasing at a rate above 2%. (See Figure 10) Moreover it appears that the benefits from the collapse in oil prices is now behind us and that will elevate the rate of change in the headline consumer price index to above 2% as well (See Figure 11)

Figure 9. Total Compensation per Hour, Percent Change Year Ago






Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Figure 10. Headline Consumer Price Index vs. Core CPI, 2011Q1 -2021Q4F, Percent Change a Year Ago





Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Figure 11. Oil Price, 2011Q1 – 2021Q4F, West Texas Intermediate, $/Barrel


Sources: Commodity Research Bureau and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Investment in Intellectual Property Remains the Bright Spot

The bright spot in the economy remains investment in intellectual property. This sector largely consists of software development, motion picture/TV production and corporate R&D. Although slowing from a torrid 7% pace in 2018, this sector will continue to grow much faster than the economy over the next few years. (See Figure 12) The continued movement of corporate computing to “the cloud” and a host of new entrants into motion picture production (i.e. Amazon, Netflix, and Hulu) are buoying this sector.

Figure 12. Real Investment in Intellectual Property, 2011Q1 -2021Q4F, Percent Change, SAAR





Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Housing Starts Remain Below Underlying Demographic Demand

We reckon that the underlying demographic demand for housing starts to be around 1.4 million – 1.5 million units a year. We have yet to achieve that level for over a decade and we forecast that it won’t be until late 2021 that housing starts exceed an annual run rate in excess of 1.4 million units. (See Figure 13) There are number of explanation for the housing’s failure to launch. They include the after effects of the Great Recession, high levels of student loan debt, the aging in place of baby boomers that is keeping housing units off the market, the concentration of job growth in high cost metropolitan areas and environmental/zoning restrictions that are restricting supply. We believe the main culprit is the last factor.

Figure 13. Housing Starts, 2011Q1 -2021Q4, Thousands of Units, SAAR








Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census and UCLA Anderson Forecast

The Twin Deficits: Federal and Trade

The consequence of the Trump Administration’s tax and spending policy is a rising fiscal deficit. After incurring a deficit of $836 billion in FY2018, the deficit will exceed a trillion dollars a year through 2021 and beyond. (See Figure 14) Part of the increase in the deficit is due to the surge in real defense spending, but as we noted above that form of spending will soon level off at a high level. (See Figure 15)

Figure 14. Federal Deficit, FY 2011-FY 2021, In $Billions, Annual Data

                                
Sources: Office of Management and Budget and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Figure 15. Real Defense Purchases, 2011 -2021, Annual Data, Percent Change

                                  

Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce and UCLA Anderson Forecast

The flip side of the budget deficit is the trade deficit. In a sense the U.S. is financing our budget deficit with the trade deficit. How so? A trade deficit implies a capital inflow to finance it. As a result the real trade deficit will increase from $920 billion in 2018 to over a trillion dollars a year over the forecast period. (See Figure 16) So much for trade protection reducing the trade deficit.

Figure 16. Real Net Exports, 2011 -2021, In $Billions, Annual Data


    
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce and UCLA Anderson Forecast

Conclusion

Our forecast has been roughly consistent for over a year. We forecast that real GDP growth will slow to below 2% in 2019 and around 1% in 2020 with a modest rebound in 2021. The jolt from the very expansionary fiscal policies of the Trump Administration will soon exhaust itself and there is a very real risk of a recession in late 2020. Meantime the unemployment rate will continue to decline to 3.6%, before gradually returning to 4%. Inflation will remain modestly above 2% and after increasing the Fed Funds rate by 25 basis points mid-year, the Fed will embark on an easing policy in 2020. By 2021 real growth will return to a 2% track.







[i] See Lafourcade, Pierre and Arend Kapteyn, “Global growth now-cast: a (very) preliminary estimate for Q1,” UBS, 18 February 2019.